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INTRODUCTION
Most failing corporations that are unsuccessful in managing
themselves file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy' protection to renovate their
financial structures after failing to reorganize the business enterprise
through restructuring debts individually. 2  Chapter 11 intends to protect
"economically viable" but failing firms from going bankrupt 3 and helps to
realize the interests of the concerned parties through maintenance and
rehabilitation of the business entity.4  While the failing company is
* Adjunct Professor at the KonKuk University School of Social Science-Chungju; Clerk of
Court at Seoul Central District Court and Supreme Court of Korea. Kim earned his Ph.D.,
MA, and LL.B. from SungKyunKwan University School of Law in Seoul, Korea and earned
his LL.M. at the University of Minnesota School of Law and Washington and Lee University
School of Law. He is an S.J.D. Candidate at Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
Kim expresses his special thanks to Laura Hyesung, Hayun, Yeojin, and Sucha Kim.
1 Generally, this applies to corporate reorganization in both the United States and
Korea. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2007) (referring to U.S. corporate reorganization);
Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act of 2006 (Act. No. 7428) (providing regulation for
corporate reorganization) (S. Korea) [hereinafter DRBA]. Please note that all references to
Korea are references to S. Korea.
2 But see Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial
Reorganization in Distressed Exchanges and Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FrN. ECON.
349, 350 (1994) (stating that there is evidence showing that creditors yield more to the
shareholders when the corporation intends to reorganize in private since the cost of Chapter
11 is higher compared to corporate reorganization by private agreement).
3 In the United States, Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code regulates liquidation. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766. In Korea, liquidation is regulated through both Part V (Corporation)
of the Commercial Act and the DRBA, supra note 1.
4 See Heidi J. Sorvino, Financial Services Update, FrNDLAw, Feb. 1, 2000,
http://library.findlaw.com/2000/Feb/1/126287.html (citing to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals' explanation that the goals and policies of bankruptcy law, as they pertain to a
Chapter 11 reorganization, are "avoidance of the consequences of economic dismemberment
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undergoing the corporate reorganization plan, it is specially protected from
creditors' "compulsory enforcements" of their legal remedies for a period
of time.5
Chapter 11 proceedings are a unique characteristic of the U.S.
bankruptcy system because they are designed for the entrepreneur to
continue business operations while preparing a corporate reorganization
plan.6 This can provide many advantages for both the entrepreneur and the
corporation,7 and is based on the belief that consistency in business
management must be maintained to protect the corporation from bankruptcy
and to normalize the corporation at an early stage.
Once a corporation begins a Chapter 11 proceeding, an "automatic
stay",8 is imposed, mandating that the corporation's assets be given the
appropriate "provisional protections" from any attachments or preliminary
injunctions that exist. This also prevents the enforcement of any pre-filing
and liquidation, and the preservation of ongoing values in a manner which does equity and is
fair to [the] right and interest of the parties affected.").
' See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129.
6 Korean bankruptcy law has three distinct characteristics. First, regarding the
submission of draft reorganization plans, the DRBA states that the court shall, where the
value of a corporation, were it to continue its business, is expected to be greater than that of
the corporation when it is liquidated, order that the receiver furnish a draft reorganization
plan within a fixed period. This plan must include options such as the continuation of
business through the continuous existence of the corporation, the merger of the corporation
with another corporation, split of the corporation, or the creation of a new corporation or the
transfer of business. This should be done on the day on which the first round of the meeting
of interested persons is held or immediately thereafter. See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 220(1).
Second, regarding submission of draft reorganization plans by creditors, the DRBA states
that the corporation, the reported reorganization creditors, the security holders, and the
shareholders may draw up a draft reorganization plan to furnish to the court within the
period described in Article 220(1). See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 221(1).
Third, there is an option for prior submission of a reorganization plan for any creditor who
holds a claim in not less than 50% of the debts of a corporation. Such creditor may lay out a
reorganization plan and file such plan with the court up to the day preceding the day on
which the first meeting of interested persons is held. See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 223(1).
7 Peter Brierley & Gertian Vlieghe, Corporate Workouts, the London Approach and
Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REv., Nov. 1999, at 168, 172, available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/1999/fsr07art7.pdf ("The U.S. insolvency
regime is often quoted as an example of a debtor-oriented regime, because the Chapter 11
procedure effectively allows the debtor to call a moratorium and negotiate restructuring
plans, which if approved by a majority of creditors are then binding on all. Both the United
Kingdom and Germany are generally regarded as examples of creditor-oriented regimes,
because they facilitate the secured creditors' ability to enforce their security.").
8 11 U.S.C. § 362. In the United States, the automatic stay for corporate assets is
granted in principle upon filing a Chapter 11 proceeding. However, "under Korean
bankruptcy laws, the court decides on a case-by-case basis whether to grant the corporate
debtor protection similar to the automatic stay." Mikyung Yun & Kyung S. Lee, A Primer
On Korean Bankruptcy Law, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 1999, at 18, 46 (1999).
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judgments, halts principal and interest payments on debts, and prevents the
creditors with secured claims from exercising their collateral rights.
9
Lawyers often hear financial, accounting, and economic terms
concerning the economic viability of the subject corporation, including
terms like "value," "liquidation value," "valuation," and "distribution."'
While handling corporate reorganization cases in the bankruptcy
department of the Seoul Central District Court of Korea, I was interested in
understanding the mutual relationships and concepts of such terms.
Regretfully, they are still areas not clearly defined, and court decisions,
academic theory, and statutes provide very little guidance. Since the core
of the corporate reorganization cases revolve around the corporation's
valuation and distribution, I intend to summarize and discuss this area as I
firmly believe these hotly-debated and navigable topics may provide
valuable insight.
This article will analyze issues arising in reorganization proceedings
with which the bankruptcy court has not yet grappled. If the questions
arising in the remainder of this article can be clearly answered, then to a
certain extent numerous arguments about Chapter 11 can be settled.
This article will also analyze both Korean and U.S. bankruptcy law
and will maintain a comparative approach with a critical perspective.
Though Korean bankruptcy law indirectly adopted11 that of the United
States in 1962, the actual application and interpretation of Korean
bankruptcy law is quite different and I will accurately compare and contrast
the two systems.
On April 2, 2007, the Korean and U.S. governments reached a free-
trade deal, also known as a free-trade agreement (FTA). Once it obtains
9 See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 45(1), (3).
10 See, e.g., Babette Ceccotti & Michael L. Bernstein, Protecting Employees and
Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007 (H.R. 3652): Two ABI Members Testify before
U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 2008, at 10 ("When the
bankruptcy laws were comprehensively revised in 1978, Congress designed the business
reorganization system to prevent the liquidation of viable businesses-to reserve ... going
concern value for all stakeholders."); id at 61 ("Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is
intended to enable a financially troubled business to restructure its operations and obligations
so that it is able to remain a going concern, and to emerge from bankruptcy as a viable and
competitive enterprise."). In addition, numerous bankruptcy literatures, cases, and media
repeatedly referred to those terms. In Korea, for example, DRBA, supra note 1, arts. 200(2),
244(1).2, and 298 directly provide those terms.
1 Originally, bankruptcy law in Korea was enacted as a trilogy: (1) the Bankruptcy
Act, enacted January 12, 1962 by Act No. 998; (2) the Corporate Reorganization Act enacted
December 12, 1962 by Act No. 1214; and (3) the Composition Act enacted January 20, 1962
by Act No. 997. The trilogy was eventually integrated on March 31, 2005 as the DRBA,
which became effective on April 1, 2006. See Elinor Kim, Corporate Insolvency Law &
Practice in South Korea in the Aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, 21 CONN. J. INT'L L.
155, 159-61 (2005).
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Congress's ratification, which could take a number of years, certain phases
of both countries' legal service markets are expected to be extensively
opened. i2 Businesses will experience more exposure to internal and
external risks and the increased possibility of insolvency resulting from
bitter global competition.
This article is organized into four main parts. Part I presents the
general doctrine of bankruptcy law theory and considers some notions for
dogmatic study. Part II discusses some of the unsettled definitions in
bankruptcy law. Part III discusses the valuation methodologies and other
related issues. Part IV discusses the distribution of corporate values.
I. CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATION PROCEEDING
The practice of bankruptcy law and its case management can change
with the degree of economic development, trends, and patterns in the
industry, as well as social and legal traditions according to the status of the
national financial situation. 13
The United States, which has experienced the most dramatic change in
bankruptcy law,14 uses the basic model in which the insolvent debtors sell
the assets, either individually or through a public fiduciary, and then
distribute the proceeds from these sold assets to creditors. A bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding is not too complex to understand. Rather, it is a
simple scheme in which an insolvent debtor distributes assets to its
creditors. This distribution may be compulsory or it may be disposed of in
bulk if a business enterprise continues to operate. 
1 5
If one understands the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding outlined
above, the fundamental principles required in the distribution of corporate
value, the method used to calculate these values, the final valuation period,
and the subject matter for valuation will all be naturally deduced.
12 See Kim Tong-hyung, Law Firms Getting Bigger Like General Hospitals, KOREA
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007 (on file with author).
13 See, e.g., Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus.
LAW. 419, 426 (1996) (arguing for one valuation method based on the consideration of
market and macroeconomic conditions).
14 See generally Veto Countryman, A History ofAmerican Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM.
L.J. 226-33 (1976); see also Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy
Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 941 (1978-1979); Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of
Bankruptcy Law, 5 J. NAT'L Ass'N REF. BANKR. 157 (1930-1931).
15 One commentator notes that the corporation will continue its business after
reorganization and its worth must be determined on a going concern basis. See John H.
Frye, IlI, The "Fair and Equitable" Doctrine: Are Liquidation Rights a Realistic Standard
During Corporate Reorganization?, 20 CATH. U. L. REv. 396 (1970-1971).
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A. Economic Aspects of Bankruptcy Reorganization
Although Professor Thomas H. Jackson compares the bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding to a common pool, 16 one may consider a
different approach to his theory. For example, a lake consists of a balance
between the water flowing in from upstream and the water being discharged
downstream. The upstream current, which can be compared to cash inflow,
will change according to the rainfall, the size of the drainage area, the
possibility of flood, the possibility of water retention by the forest upstream,
and the size of the inlet passage. From the perspective of the lake owner,
the inflow will increase if he plants trees, maintains the water passage, or
increases the size of the lake's drainage area. However, if a reduction in the
water inflow is caused by a fundamental change in rainfall patterns rather
than the lake owner's external improvements, then the lake owner's
improvements could be regarded as an unwise investment.
As it relates to corporate financing, the lake is comparable to a
corporation and the water can be compared to cash or income. Depending
on the circumstances, the water discharged downstream could increase 17 as
the demand for water increases in the bear market; a corporation could then
reduce business projects or the number of employees. If there is a
consistent reduction in "water" flowing in from upstream, then the
corporation will become economically depressed and may even be
considered a declining industry. However, if the cause of the reduction in
the water inflow is temporary, then the corporation may be considered to be
under financial distress and its operation can be restored by either
eliminating the cause of the reduction or by reinvesting into the upstream
current. Although there may be a balance in the amount of water coming in
from upstream and the water being discharged downstream, there may be a
delay in the discharge from the lake for any number of reasons.
The lake can be closed down (by liquidation or dissolution or winding)
and the remaining water can be transferred to another lake (by merger), or a
new lake can be created if the amount of water in the lake decreases or if
water temporarily stops being discharged from the lake. Some have argued
that the role of the bankruptcy court in reorganization proceedings is limited
16 Professor Jackson illustrates two problems associated with bankruptcy
reorganization: the "common pool" problem and a multiparty game, which he calls the
"prisoner's dilemma." See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 10-19 (1986). The common pool theory is a metaphorical representation of aspects of
the economic phenomena regarding the bankruptcy reorganization which the failed company
relied upon to revive. In this hypothetical metaphor, the utmost results are drawn from
competing interest holders such as creditors and shareholders.
17 This situation would be likened to a corporation under financial distress. Since the
amount of water inflow did not decrease, the function of the lake will be restored if the
amount of water outflow is properly maintained.
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to merely transferring the remaining assets.' 8 Therefore, the bankruptcy
court is often blamed for failing to quickly make such transfers.1 9
However, transferring the remaining water or creating a new lake does not
solve the entire problem because the purpose of bankruptcy law does not
necessarily require such action by the parties involved.
After calculating the amount of water to be drained, the amount of
incoming or evaporating water, and the cost of maintaining the lake, the
bankruptcy court takes on a maintenance role and focuses more on how to
maintain the lake and preserve the water.
20
If it was considered economical for the lake owner and those with the
right to receive the water to transfer the water to another lake, there would
be no need for the corporate reorganization proceeding. However, if the
water were to be transferred to another lake, it would reduce the amount of
water inflow during the process. Moreover, there may be no plans for
utilizing an empty lake. If the lake's use is not changed but the process of
keeping and discharging water is continued, there would be no need to incur
the costs of completely transferring the water.
Creditors and debtors may think that deciding not to transfer the water
in the lake is economical.2 ' If there is limited water coming in (due to
18 Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their
Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 27 (1988).
19 The general criticism of the bankruptcy law in Korea is that the process takes too
much time. See Lee Jang-yung, Korea's Reform: Still A Strong Momentum, KOREA TIMES,
June 19, 2001 (on file with author).
20 In his common pool theory, Professor Jackson only mentions how to catch the
individual fish in the lake rather than how to raise and manage all the fish. See JACKSON,
supra note 16, at 11-12.
21 Professor Heymann warned that unharmonious efforts of creditors and
shareholders to achieve higher priorities in a reorganization company after debt adjustment
may generate a capital structure that is very disadvantageous to the company even if each
party understands the outcome of discordance. To illustrate this principle, Professor
Heymann references a metaphorical story about buffalo hunters, for whom it was clear that
the number of buffalo in their hunting ground would eventually decrease if they did not
restrict their reckless hunting and discordant behaviors, even though the hunters did not
individually wish for or plan such a consequence. Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of
Coordination: Bargaining and Rule, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 815 (1973).
Professor Schelling also warned about the risk of destructive liquidation in corporate
reorganization through a similar buffalo metaphor. Under any circumstance, buffalo would
be more valuable as live animals than as leather fifteen years later. If a market forms fifteen
years later, the hunter who killed fifty buffalo to make leather fifteen years ago would have
no profits from his old leather. He could not both demand buffalo and market his property
rights to baby buffalo fifteen years later. See Thomas C. Schelling, On the Ecology of
Micromotives, 25 PUB. INT. 61, 73 (1971).
Based on this logic, the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts have applied the absolute priority rule to
forcefully approve of reorganization plans against an "opposing class of interested persons."
Professor Roe states that "cram-down" litigation emerged because of the uncertainties of
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difficulty in raising funds in the stock market or obtaining a loan from a
financial institution) and the amount of water evaporating is small, then the
cost of maintaining the lake is likely low. Accordingly, it is possible, if the
creditors agree to the temporary cessation of water outflow, to reorganize
where the corporate governance and capital structure are changed and the
outflow of water is reduced.
B. Economic Efficiency of Bankruptcy Law
The bankruptcy reorganization proceeding must be carried out while
considering its potential impact on the national economy as well as the
debtors' employees and the society in which they live. Moreover, one
should consider the proceeding's impact on third parties at the time of the
reorganization's plan confirmation along with the cram-down. However,
the proceeding should not be executed or terminated based on the principles
of societal economic efficiency "publicness" 22 or "macroeconomics.'
23
A business does not permanently vanish from the economic world at
the time of liquidation just because debts are cleared. If, however, the
financial health of the debtor's business is declining, all the machines will
be sold for scrap and the buildings and land will be either disposed of or
sold. However, whether the proceeding is for liquidation, reorganization, or
discharging the debt, selling all the machines for scrap is rare for a
corporation on the brink of bankruptcy.24 Instead, much to the displeasure
of the existing creditors and debtors, the business will often continue under
a new owner who takes over the business after a sale and purchases the
operating machines at a price close to that of junk. Therefore, there is
significance in collective debt handling.
Neither creditors nor debtors would wish to dispose of the machines as
junk if any operating profit, however little, could be realized. Even if an
valuation in the court. He also notes that such uncertainty is similar to the court's
manipulation of a traffic light that is not clearly visible in order to harmonize the traffic flow.
When there is uncertainty regarding the light, drivers cannot avoid accidents and the court
must not neglect this problem. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for
Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537-46 (1983).
22 Martin D. Jacobson, The Secured Creditor's Right to Full Liquidation Value in
Corporate Reorganization, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 510, 527 (1974-1975) (noting "the
bankruptcy reorganization law was not aimed to give public subsidy.").
23 Macroeconomics deals with and seeks to analyze the determinants of aggregate
trends in the economy with particular focus on national income, unemployment, inflation,
investment, and international trade. In contrast, microeconomics is primarily focused on the
determination of prices and the role of prices in allocating scarce resources. See generally,
N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 27-28 (2d ed. 2001).
24 Jonathan Hicks, Foxes Guarding the Henhouse: The Modern Best Interests of
Creditors Test in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 5 NEV. L.J. 820, 821 (2005) (noting, however,
that "[a] debtor usually prepares an analysis which estimates a liquidation recovery based
upon a sort of 'fire-sale' conditions resulting in severely depressed liquidation proceeds.").
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operating profit is not being generated, the creditors may be willing to take
a partial loss to control the time of sale. They can do this only by making
changes in the corporate governance and capital structure to allow for
profits in the selling of the business. According to such a model, the
bankruptcy court cannot force the debtors to proceed with the bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding on the grounds that the liquidation value is high
while disregarding the wishes of the creditors and debtors. 25
To determine whether a reorganization proceeding is appropriate, one
must consider the economic efficiency of each individual corporation and
of society as a whole. If it is better for the entire society to sell the
individual corporation and to have a new owner control the new business,
then a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding is likely inappropriate.
However, if it is considered economical for the existing corporation to start
anew rather than be sold, then reorganization proceedings should be
executed.
Under the latter scenario, workers remain employed and
subcontractors continue to supply parts, but only as an incidental effect of
the above proceedings.26 Therefore, the initial purpose of a bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding does not lie in the "publicness" or economic
efficiency of macroeconomics, though both concepts may be similar in
nature. However, carrying out the proceeding for the sake of the public and
securing the public from the incidental effects of the collective debt
proceeding must be distinguished.
C. Discussion of Corporate Reorganization Law in Korea
In the United States, the application of corporate valuation principles
depends upon considering at what stage and on what standards the
bankruptcy court should evaluate the corporation and how that value is
distributed. In this context, existing Korean law, which is in clear
incongruity to such principles, is neither good policy nor good law and
revision should be considered.27 For example, the regulation that requires a
25 In fact, the government's role in corporate restructuring should be minimal and
such activity should be left to the private sector as much as possible. See E. HAN KIM,
GLOBALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, IN THE
REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 461, 468 (Joel M. Stem & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds.,
4th ed. 2003).
26 "Bankruptcy policy [should] take into account the distributional impact of a
business failure on parties who are not creditors [e.g., employees] and who have no formal
legal rights to the assets of the business." Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in An
Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 354-55 (1993).
27 With regard to termination prior to approval of a reorganization plan, the DRBA
provides that where a liquidated company's value is greater than that of the same company
which continues its business as a going concern even after the order to file a draft of a
reorganization plan, the court shall, upon a motion from a receiver or ex officio, decide on
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mandatory declaration of bankruptcy 28  upon termination of the
reorganization proceeding due to a high liquidation value must be
repealed.29 In this case, creditors would prefer a bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding where the bankruptcy court considered only the "publicness, ' 3°
while debtors would prefer the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding where
the bankruptcy court considered only economic efficiency.31 This decision,
however, should be made dispassionately.
Korean corporate reorganization law goes further and stipulates that
the corporate reorganization proceeding shall be terminated if the
liquidation value is higher than the going concern value before the
confirmation of the reorganization plan.3  The problem with this approach
becomes apparent when one considers the possible alternatives.
A thorough investigation of going concern value 34 and liquidation
value must be continued, and the information should be disclosed to the
public as well as to creditors and shareholders. Furthermore, the need for a
prompt execution of the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding must be
acknowledged. Even if the liquidation value is higher at the time, the going
concern value can be adjusted to be higher than the liquidation value.
3W
the termination of reorganization proceedings before it decides whether to grant
authorization of a reorganization plan. See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 286(2).
28 With regard to the shift to bankruptcy proceedings, the DRBA states that where a
definite decision is made to abolish the reorganization proceedings or to disapprove of a
reorganization plan for a company prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, the court shall
declare a bankruptcy ex officio. See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
29 In the United States, it is a general rule that "a court will not confirm a plan of
reorganization unless the value of the firm as a continuing enterprise exceeds the liquidation
value of its assets." Elizabeth Jane Schwartz, Inflation and the Concept of Reorganization
Value, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1727, 1729-30 (1981).
30 Reorganization policy provides that the "[d]istributions under a plan of
reorganization must meet not only the cramdown test, but the 'best interests' test as well."
Lynn M. Lopucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 741, 762 (2004).
31 Id. at 766 (providing rationale of the economic efficiency of the debtor's side upon
the team production theory).
32 The DRBA states that when a liquidated corporation's value is greater than the
value of the same corporation when it continues its business, the court shall, upon an
application from a receiver or reported unsecured creditors or secured collateral holders, or
ex officio, decide on the termination of reorganization proceedings without any order to
submit a draft reorganization plan under Article 220(1); provided that the same shall not
apply to the case where permission is granted for the compilation of a draft plan focused on
liquidation. See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 285.
33 It should be noted that "[r]egardless of the particular method employed, any
valuation is, at best, only an estimate of value." David F. Heroy & Adam R. Schaeffer,
Valuation in Bankruptcy, 877 PLI/CoMM 27, 44 (2005).
34 A corporation must be appraised on a going concern basis because the corporation
will continue its business after reorganization. See Frye, supra note 15, at 396.
35 See Michael J. Alderson & Brian L. Betker, Liquidation vs. Continuation: Did
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:119 (2009)
This can occur as a result of a change in the economic situation or success
of the reorganization after reviewing the "liquidation-oriented
reorganization plan" 36 or reviewing the scheme for the debtors' "debt-for-
equity swap" 37 in order to control the time for the disposal of assets by
creditors.
It is not the purpose of bankruptcy law to preclude options other than
Chapter 7 liquidation for creditors and debtors after declaration of
bankruptcy liquidation and termination of the reorganization proceeding.38
Rather, going concern value is just a single factor in considering the
possibility of execution and is not itself determinative.
Although the Chapter 11 corporate reorganization proceeding can be
executed even if the Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation proceeding is in
progress, this seems contrary to economic efficiency because such an
approach is, in effect, repetitive. While continuing business after the
execution of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation, if the corporation judges
the liquidation value to be higher, then a business may apply for a Chapter
11 corporate reorganization proceeding. However, if the liquidation value
Reorganized Firms Do the Right Thing? 1, 4 (Nov. 1995), http://www.ssm.com/ (last visited
May 5, 2008) ("Given the uncertainty surrounding the efficiency of the business, however,
reorganized firms with high liquidation values can and should weigh the merits of
continuation more frequently.").
36 In the United States there is no difference in the requisites for reorganization plan
approval between a liquidation-oriented reorganization plan and a general reorganization
plan. See John C. Anderson & Peter G. Wright, Liquidation Plans of Reorganization, 56
AM. BANKR. L.J. 29 (1982).
37 In the United States, the debt-for-stock exception originated in the common law;
and provided a corporation was either insolvent or in bankruptcy and issued stock to its
creditors in exchange for their indebtedness, the financially troubled corporations would
receive tax benefits. See Michelle Amopol Cecil, Reinvigorating Chapter 11: The Case for
Reinstating the Stock-for-Debt Exception in Bankruptcy, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 1001, 1003.
38 The following may prove helpful in understanding this issue:
Insolvency in the equity sense is a generic concept meaning inability to pay debts
as they mature. Insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as defined by the Bankruptcy
Act, means that the fair value of all of a debtor's assets is insufficient to pay all his
liabilities. The distinction not only is important from a standpoint of knowing
what particular remedies are available to the debtor or creditor under the
Bankruptcy Act, but also is significant as a basic starting point in assessing the
possibilities of a successful rehabilitation of the debtor. Insolvency in the equity
sense implies the possibility of only a temporarily short cash position, an
unseasonable loss of income, bad business judgment in a particular transaction, or
other temporary financial embarrassment. Insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, on
the other hand, implies the more grave circumstances of losses over a substantial
period of time or irreparable weakness in the debtor's capital structure or business.
Paul B. Rodden & James E. Carpenter, Corporate Insolvency-Liquidation or
Rehabilitation, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 117, 118 (1964) (internal citations omitted).
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is considered to be higher during the reorganization proceeding, then the
vicious cycle of going back to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation
proceeding may be repeated.
D. Fundamental Principles in Bankruptcy Reorganization Proceedings
Since there are two concerned parties in the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding (creditors and debtors), the bankruptcy judge should decide
which options are economically beneficial from both perspectives. In
carrying out the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding, the bankruptcy
judge should not base his or her decision about the existence of economic
efficiency on a macroeconomic theory.
The purpose of a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding lies not in
recovering individual debt, but in handling the debt collectively. 39  In
handling collective debt, one must decide whether to sell the assets
individually or in bulk and how best to distribute the corporate value to
concerned parties such as creditors and shareholders.
In order to collectively handle the debt, the amount of debt to be paid
must be decided by debtors, creditors, a public fiduciary (receiver), and the
trustee, who then determine the assets' earning power and pay the
obligation. 40 The means of restructuring the coToration should be selected
based on the evaluated assets, earning power, and the confirmed debt
owed to all parties. This corresponds to the theory of utilitarianism in
which the greatest happiness will occur for the greatest number.42
The judge in the bankruptcy court, in deciding upon a method of
restructuring, should balance the fundamental principles of bankruptcy law
with the interests of the concerned parties. A final judgment of corporate
value should be made by the bankruptcy court when the desires of the
39 The Seoul High Court held that corporate reorganization of a financially troubled
firm is, in essence, a collective debt treatment procedure. See Judgment of Dec. 14, 2006 Na
18022, (Seoul High Ct.) at 14. The collective action bars agreement ex post against certain
kinds of ex ante agreements. See Claire Finkelstein, Financial Distress as a Noncooperative
Game: A Proposal for Overcoming Obstacles to Private Workouts, 102 YALE L.J. 2205,
2213 (1993).
40 According to one commentator, "[t]here are two steps in determining a valuation
based on earnings. First, the average earnings are computed for a base period; this gives the
earning capacity of the company. Second, such earning capacity is multiplied by an
appropriate capitalization." William C. Childs, Control of Transfer of Business Interests,
1958 U. ILL. L. F. 79, 90. For more specific discussion on that issue, see id
41 Valuation has been called the "key" to the reorganization and it is to be made by
duly considering the earning power of the property as well as all other relevant facts. See
Mortimer M. Caplin, Valuation and Earnings in Railroad Reorganization: A Consideration
of the Proposed Amendment to Section 77, 27 VA. L. REv. 772 (1940-41).
42 See Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification And Excuse: What They Were, What They
Are, And What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 725, 796 n.3 (2004) (quoting John
Stuart Mill's definition of the Greatest Happiness Principle).
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interested parties have been ascertained by a vote.
Finally, the bankruptcy court should supervise whether a "fresh start"
is being properly carried out in accordance with the aforementioned plan for
restructuring.43 It is not advisable to let such supervision continue for a
long time considering the nature of the judiciary. Ultimately, there should
be indirect supervision through advice of the receiver, the management
committee," and creditors.
E. Critical Interpretation for Corporate Reorganization Law
Considering the above model for the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding and its fundamental principles, I think corporate reorganization
law in Korea needs to be revised.
Korean law requires that the bankruptcy 41udge apply corporate
reorganization law like a mathematical formula. In some cases, this
mathematical formula is not applicable (e.g. if the difference between the
liquidation value and the going concern value is large). Regardless, there
will be nothing more agonizing than deciding whether to terminate
corporate reorganization proceedings using only comparison data like a
mathematical formula when there is not much difference in the amount
being compared.46 For an extreme example, let us set the going concern
value at 99.9 billion Korean Won (KRW), the liquidation value at KRW
100 billion, and the asset value at KRW 120 billion. If the corporate
reorganization proceeding had to be abolished due to the difference in
KRW of only 0.1 billion without confirming the intention of creditors and
debtors about the means of reorganization, parties would be hesitant to
consent to such a conclusion.
Corporate reorganization law in Korea appears to be built on the
macroeconomic theory that a corporation with a higher.liquidation value is
more economical when liquidated rather than reorganized, regardless of the
47creditors' and debtors' intents. However, the life and death of everycorporation should not be decided by this macroeconomic theory because of
43 See generally Nicholas L. Georgakpoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, 3 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FrN. 125 (1997) [hereinafter Georgakopoulos I].
44 The management committee is equal to a U.S. trustee and has a similar function
and role.
45 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46 See Alderson & Betker, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that it is advisable that "[gliven
the uncertainty surrounding the efficiency of the business, however, reorganized firms with
high liquidation values can and should weigh the merits of continuation more frequently.").
47 Id. (noting that if companies have low liquidation values, on the other hand, the
court will find "partial or complete liquidation to be costly" and therefore [even if
reorganization proceeds are high the plan will be] unfeasible).
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the defectiveness of corporate valuation.48
Existing corporate reorganization law in Korea emphasizes economic
efficiency while putting the corporate assets and the corporation's earning
power first, which I claim is an improper practice because "the earnings
estimate in the valuation process is only one of the variables in the
valuation formula that will determine whether that goal is achieved" 49 and
"it is a matter of informed judgment rather than certitude."'5
The debtors or the public fiduciary must first confirm the amount of
each debtor's entire debt and then devise a scheme for paying back the
debts or reorganizing the corporation. 5' The reorganization scheme should
be based on the assets evaluated by debtors, creditors, and earning power.
52
Fundamental changes to corporate governance and capital structure
53
should also be considered. When evaluating secured claims, the relevant
question is whether the earning power of the subject matter collateral
should be the basis of the valuation. 54 In other words, after evaluating the
future earning power of the corporation as a whole, should this future
earning power be divided proportionately according to each individual asset
or should the future earning power of each individual asset be evaluated
first and then added up to determine whether this individual valuation
exceeds the aggregate?
The entire scheme will be presented, detailing the separate asset sale,
the bulk sale while continuing the business, and the distribution of future
earning power including changes in the status of the concerned parties
based on the aforementioned valuations.
Corporate reorganization law in Korea does not go through the process
outlined above. Instead, Korean law first compares the going concern value
with the liquidation value. Only when the liquidation value is lower than
the going concern value will the corporate reorganization proceeding be
executed and will review of the amount of debt and the possibility of its
48 See infra part III C-E.
49 See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1733.
50 Id. at 1734.
51 DRBA, supra note 1, arts.166 & 220(1). Unlike the United States, the debtor in
Korea cannot enjoy a 120-day exclusivity period in which to file a plan of reorganization.
52 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
53 For appropriate capital structuring, the fundamental issue is simply the choice
between debt and equity. Difficult as it may be to determine an optimal structure, one expert
suggests some methods: peer group comparison, credit-rating analysis, and cash flow
analysis. See TIM KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING
AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES, 476, 483-84 (4th ed. 2005).
54 See Childs, supra note 40, at 89 (noting that "[t]he value of many businesses
depends primarily, if not almost exclusively, on earnings .... The less the investment of the
company in capital assets, the greater is the importance of the earnings in determining
value.").
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payment be deferred.55  Economic efficiency should be considered when
drafting administrative policies and when investments are made by creditors
and shareholders. In other words, if economic efficiency is believed to
exist due to the generation of operating profit, either the government can
support it through policies or the creditors and shareholders can make
additional investments.
In this case, the issue in Korea concerning the application of the "New
Value Exception ' 56 is whether it is allowable for shareholders to hold their
shares instead of investing new capital even if shareholders with seniority
do not a ree with the reorganization plan and cannot receive full
payments. These policies, however, have nothing to do with the
bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. The bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding is, in principle, not based on support by the administration or
new investment by creditors and shareholders, but instead has a structure
where sale (liquidation or bankruptcy) to the third parties is made or sale to
concerned parties such as creditors is made.58 It is against all reason to
emphasize economic efficiency in the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding. Economic efficiency is an item to be seriously considered in
such cases as maintaining the policies and new investment.
In the United States, when a corporation is faced with insolvency due
to circumstances that arose after an investment was made in an effort
toward economic efficiency, the purpose of bankruptcy law lies in
dissolving the insolvency. Bankruptcy law does not exist to save a
corporation by creating economic efficiency or by liquidating a corporation
that lacks economic efficiency.59 The principles of economic efficiency are
55 Even though the fundamental purpose of business reorganization is to prevent a
debtor from going into liquidation, the generally accepted ruling specifies that "a shareholder
receives no payment for its stock in liquidation if, at the time of the liquidation, the fair
market value of the corporation's assets, including ... going concern value, is less than the
corporation's liabilities." Marjorie A. Rollinson, Margaret M. O'Connor, David M. Benson
& Eric E. Oman, "Hybrid' Entities: Practical Application Under The Check-The-Box
Regime, 821 PLI/TAx 9, 49 (2008). The only remaining issue, therefore, is whether the cash
payments to the unsecured claims can be deferred because secured claims may be subject to
cram-down provisions.
56 See generally Nicholos L. Georgakopoulos, New Value, After LaSalle, 20 BANKR.
DEV. J. 1 (2003); see also Georgakopoulos I, supra note 43, at 125.
57 See Yun & Lee, supra note 8, at 46 (noting that the New Value Exception doctrine
in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939) is an exception
to the absolute priority rule. In Korea, there is no statutory provision or court decision on
this doctrine so it is a hot issue whether this rule may be applied to the specific case).
58 See Alderson & Betker, supra note 35, at 4 (noting that "[t]he high debt levels of
reorganized firms are appropriate for both controlling overinvestment and, in the event of
default, providing the creditors with a means of forcing the firm into immediate
liquidation.").
59 Lopucki, supra note 30, at 743 (noting that "bankruptcy exists to serve a variety of
policies and therefore a variety of interests" and that the noncontractarian argues that
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not seriously reviewed at the phase of investment and drafting of policies.6 °
In Korea, it is reversed. Why should everything head in the direction of
economic efficiency upon entering the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding?
The principles of economic efficiency, however, should not be
neglected in the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding. Since the purpose
of a reorganization plan is to reduce debt and fixed costs, 61 the execution of
the reorganization plan of a corporation must be verified and a
determination must be made as to whether or not the priority of claims is
protected for the concerned parties. However, even in these situations, the
principles of economic efficiency are merely considerations in the decision
but not an absolute standard.
One might argue that the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) approach,62
considered by some to be an absolute principle for deciding economic
efficiency, is merely a fraud or an illusion.63 Such a decision must be made
within two months of the commencement of the corporate reorganization
proceeding.64 However, it is unacceptable to allow the fortune of a
corporation to vanish in a moment due to such a decision.
Whether to make the judgment of economic efficiency at an early or
late phase of the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding is clearly a matter of
legislative policy. In Korea, the legislature has determined that economic
efficiency should be determined at an early phase and the problems in the
DCF approach may be solved through practical management. 65 However,
bankruptcy does not place economic efficiency first. "[T]he losses should be shared among
all interested parties, including creditors and shareholders.").
60 See Alderson & Betker, supra note 35, at 5 ("If in spite of being inefficient,
reorganization is chosen over liquidation, the 'success' of a Chapter 11 plan can only be
evaluated by comparing the cash flows from reorganization with the cash flows that would
have been available under liquidation.").
61 See Frye, supra note 15, at 403.
62 See infra Part IlI C.1.
63 See Jongkoo Yun, Ki-up-ga-chi-pyeong-ga mit gu-bae-boon-bang-beop-eh-kwan-
han-so-go [A Study on the Valuation of the Companies and Distribution of the Values Under
In-court Reorganization Procedures] 28-29 (Apr. 11, 2002) (S. Korea) (unpublished
comment, on file with the Seoul Central District Court Bankruptcy Law Research Society);
see also KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 129-30.
64 Ironically, in the United States, there is case law that assigned the commencement
date as the valuation timing standard. See In re Farmer, 257 B.R. 556 (Bankr. D. Mont.
2000). In the United States, the debtor company may request an extension from 120 days to
180 days with a showing that the size of the case is too large and complicated to file within
120 days; see also Howard Karasik, Extending the Debtor's Exclusive Right to File a Plan of
Reorganization, 90 COM. L. J. 359-40 (1985).
65 One industry commentator expressed the view that the low confidence in the DCF
model in the market arena is not an indictment of analytical approach but rather of analytical
methods. Further he addressed "[m]ost DCF models fail to meet the standards of economic
soundness and transparency." See Michael J. Mauboussin, Common Errors in DCF
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the economic situation in Korea is no longer at a developing stage and
instead is moving into a maturity stage. With the help of "investment in
science and technology" and the government's "active industrial policy,"
the national "economy transited from an industrial to a knowledge-based
economy., 66 When this circumstance exists, the operating profit is said to
be only 5.5% of sales.67 When the operating profit rate is so high and the
going concern value is evaluated by the standard of the "discounted rate"
68
in use, most corporations will have a high liquidation value. 69 However,
actual liquidation does not frequently take place, which requires
interpretation. On the other hand, if the bankruptcy court evaluates the
going concern value optimistically, it is sure to be the subject of criticism.
It is thought that there should be a guarantee of the liquidation value at
the time of the revision of the current U.S. bankruptcy law.70  It is the
practice of the Seoul bankruptcy court, if possible, to file the reorganization
plan in such a way that the liquidation value is guaranteed.71  Since the
filing of the reorganization plan is required by a decree only against a
corporation with a high going concern value, guaranteeing liquidation value
is not often difficult. 72  It can be easily settled by setting the total cash
outflow higher than the liquidation value.
73
Models-Do You Use Economically Sound and Transparent Models? MAUBOUSSIN ON
STRATEGY 2 (2006), http://www.lmcm.com/pdf/CommonErrors.pdf.
66 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Stage of Economic Development, Speech at the Chinese
Academy of Arts and Sciences (June 19, 2004).
67 See Hyosik Lee, High Wages Erode Corporate Profitability, KOREA TIMES, Nov.
7, 2007, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/biz-view.asp?newsldx=13315&
categoryCode=123; see also Korean Corporate Profitability Falls in 2006, KOREA TIMEs
Dec. 31, 2007, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/include/print.asp?news Idx=13264.
" See infra Part III D.
69 See infra Appendix I (noting the operating profit ratio correlate with sales and
going concern value variations in the cases of discount rates 15%, 10%, and 5%).
70 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2006). This clause provides that:
[T]he court shall confirm a plan only if... with respect to each impaired class of
claims or interests, each holder of a claim or interest of such class will receive or
retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of
the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder
would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title
on such date.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 For discussion on the guarantee of the liquidation value in the United States, see
H.R Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess. 412 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6312.
72 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 165 (introducing valuation methods of
the liquidation value such as orderly liquidation analysis, forced-sale liquidation).
73 In the United States, however, "[s]ome bankruptcy scholars consider the
liquidation value of a firm to be equal to the firm's reorganization value. That is, they
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Of course, there are controversies surrounding this approach.74 In the
United States, the law is more focused on the guarantee of the creditors'
priority claims and whether the guarantee exceeds the liquidation value,
75
but there is no statutory stipulation that the going concern value should be
higher than the liquidation value for the confirmation of the reorganization
plan.
76
believe that bankruptcy courts can 'liquidate' businesses by selling them as going concerns
in Chapter 11 for their full going concern value." Lopucki, supra note 30, at 762.
74 See Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S.
Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FN. 747, 753 & 768 (1989) (arguing the absolute priority rule
that must be followed during the corporate reorganization proceeding was not followed by
twenty-one out of twenty-seven corporations they had studied, and the shareholders of
eighteen corporations received a large sum of distribution that they considered to be a
violation of the absolute priority rule as a paradoxical regulation); see also Brian L. Betker,
Management's Incentive, Equity's Bargaining Power, and Deviations from Absolute Priority
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 68 J. Bus. 161 (1995) (stating that the absolute priority rule in
Chapter 11 is violated by a large degree when the corporation is likely to revive, the bank
has a small stake, the CEO has the most shares, and the corporation can file the
reorganization plan by itself); Allan C. Eberhart, Rodney L. Roenfeldt, & William T. Moore,
Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy
Reorganization Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990) (stating the reason for the violation of
the absolute priority rule is because the enterpriser prepares the corporate reorganization
plan, which puts him at an advantage during the negotiation with creditors because creditors
lack sufficient information and thus yield their share to the shareholders to avoid the
potential cost in delaying negotiation); Allan C. Eberhart & Lemma W. Senbet. Absolute
Priority Rule Violations and Risk Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms, 45 FIN.
MGMT. 1457 (1993) (insisting that the violation of the absolute priority rule has a significant
role in easing the problem of proxy between creditors and shareholders by lessening the
shareholders' motive for increasing the risk of an insolvent corporation); Lawrence A.
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 285 (1990) (reporting that violations of the absolute priority rule often occur among
creditors with unsecured claims, between the creditors without unsecured claims, and
shareholder but the rule is followed by creditors with secured claims).
71 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). This clause provides
that:
[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes
the...
•.. secured claims, the plan provides
... for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
Id. It is not directly related to the distribution of going concern value. Also it is a different
concept from absolute priority rule that applied between creditor and shareholder, among
creditors and shareholders. Id.
76 See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
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Furthermore, if the liquidation value exceeds the going concern value,
there can be problems in the feasibility of the reorganization plan.77
However, such problems can be settled by using a debt-for-equity swap
with creditors. If the creditors have a 100% right over the corporate value
through such a swap, the liquidation value is guaranteed and the feasibility
of the reorganization plan becomes enhanced as portions of the debts
disappear.78 There are two methods of debt-for-equity swaps: (i) granting
the option of buying the rights of senior creditors to junior creditors 79 and
(ii) allowing the debt-for-equity swaps only to unsecured creditors.80 In
corporate reorganization in Korea, the conversion right is given to both
unsecured reorganization creditors and secured creditors. 81 However, the
ratio of claims in a debt-for-equity swap is decided in accordance with a
report prepared by the reorganization trustee appointed by the court. 
82
Government distrust of bankruptcy court reorganization proceedings is
evidenced by the statutory restriction on time. The law in Korea, known as
the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (DRBA), has been in effect
since May 2006 and remains effective today without amendment.83  The
current economy is not as abnormal as it was during the Asian foreign
exchange crisis of 1997 and bankruptcy law in Korea is not a by-product of
a government-led policy of rationalization of industry for the purpose of
achieving economic efficiency as was the case four decades ago. It will not
be easy to make ideal bankruptcy law, but good law can be made if the
77 Feasibility requirement on the plan imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(1 1).
78 Of course, in this case, a plan of reorganization may be confirmed only if
"[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the
plan .. " 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006).
79 Cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach To Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (proposing granting purchasing options to junior creditors and
distributing the value of the company among the creditors).
80 See Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, & John Moore, Improving Bankruptcy
Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 849, 869 (1994) (proposing issuance of stock or mix or stock
and options to unsecured creditors while keeping secured creditors' claims intact).
81 In the United States, there is plenty of discussion regarding debt-for-share
exchange. See Chad C. Coombs, Original Issue Discount in Debt-for-Debt and Debt-for-
Share Exchanges, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675 (1991). The U.S. courts have reviewed this
subject from the perspective of whether the conversion can be nullified by fraud; see, e.g.,
Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Corporate Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. Vantress (In re Corporate Jet Aviation, Inc.), 57 B.R. 195 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1986) (noting that if the claim holder receives shares less than the equal reasonable value of
claims, it may be violation of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2) and thus it might be
fraud and the conversion can be nullified, and that the courts have considered the validity of
debt for equity swap based on the value of shares and whether or not the debtor firm can pay
the conversion capital).
82 See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 217.
83 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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principles discussed are considered and the legislative purpose of the
DRBA is substantially followed.
As a result of the enactment of the DRBA, the newly-established
Korean Supreme Court Civil Trial Rule No. 1063 (JaeMin 2006-5)
(Rules),84 which regulates the procedure of a corporate reorganization case
and valuation, should also be considered for revision. 85 The Rules that are
in place were built on a basic model of making installment payments for all
debt over a long period of time without exempting the principal of debts
occurring prior to the corporate reorganization plan. Thus, future earning
power 86 is an important factor in preparing for the payment of funds. In
order to evaluate future earning power, it would be reasonable to evaluate
the going concern value by using the future DCF approach.87  However,
since the existing corporate reorganization plan introduces the exemption of
the principal of the debt or the extensive use of debt-for-equity swaps, using
the future DCF approach for evaluating the going concern value may not be
regarded as the absolute standard.88  In the DRBA, it is expressed as the
value only when the corporation continues its operation but is not
considered value based on earning power.
Thus there should be flexibility in the methodology of valuing a
corporation. The current practice of separating the valuation of the
corporate value (the filing order of reorganization plan)89 and the
distribution of the value (the drawing up of the reorganization plan) should
be changed. In other words, the structure should be based on the
reorganization plan approved in a meeting by the concerned parties and
should appropriately reflect the corporate value with the evaluated contents
of the plan. A new approach should also provide the chance to see the
feasibility of the reorganization plan and whether the distribution is made
84 See infra notes 150, 220 and accompanying text.
85 In the United States, "The Bankruptcy Code does not prescribe any particular
method of valuing collateral [or assets or enterprise value], thus according judges
considerable leeway on a case by case basis." Harold S. Novikoff & Andrew S. Jacobs,
Valuation Issues in Chapter 11 Cases, SK092 ALI-ABA 395, 406 (2005) (quoting
Congressional hearing).
86 Interestingly, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals states that "all valuations based on
estimates of future earnings are bound to be guesses in the sense of reaching into the future."
Bondholders, Inc. v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 342 U.S. 921, 924 (1952).
87 The Korean court only accepts the DCF approach valuation report under the Rules.
On the other hand, in the U.S. Bankruptcy court, the valuation hearings are a battle field of
experts who report the debtor corporation's valuation based on various standards. See, e.g.,
Novikoff & Jacobs, supra note 85, at 402.
88 The U.S. Financial Accounting Standard Board has offered an alternative
methodology for valuation, which it feels better accounts for the uncertainties inherent in
projecting future cash flows. See ALFRED M. KING, VALUATION-WHAT ASSETS ARE
REALLY WORTH 99 (2002).
89 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2006).
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upon a "fair and equitable doctrine." 90
If flexibility is permitted in the way going concern value is calculated,
the above practice will be possible under current bankruptcy law. However,
under a new practice scheme, the basic corporate value evaluation will be
the future DCF approach and will consider "publicness" and economic
efficiency as well as the going concern value in a "stock concept." 9' By
distinguishing publicly-held corporations from cl6sely-held corporations
and allowing the creditors to make proper use of the debt-for-equity swap
mechanism in the case of listed corporations, there would be no impediment
to carrying out the reorganization plan even if future earnings prove
inadequate or to covering outstanding debt since the creditors can recover
their equity in the stock market.
II. DISCUSSION OF CONFUSING DEFINITIONS
Viability of a reorganization plan is often a core issue in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding. However, the appraisal of value and distribution of
its result are creditors' and equity holders' main concerns. With regard to
enterprise valuation, there are lots of unsettled definitions92 that comprise
the reorganization plan. This portion of the article addresses some of the
confusing definitions.
A. Understanding the Stock and Flow Concept
The primary inquiry might be the standard used in valuing the
corporation: the "stock" concept or the "flow" concept. These concepts are
distinguished by the balance sheet showing the financial condition of a
corporation at a specific point in time in the former 93 and the income
statement showing a business's financial output by operations in the latter. 94
This same logic is applied to the going concern value. One may value a
corporation at any point in time by either calculating its assets or by
calculating its future cash flow.
95
There should be no confusion as to the meaning of the going concern
value since it generally refers to both of these definitions. To prevent any
90 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(2)(B) (2006).
9' See infra Part II A.
92 See, e.g., Pantaleo & Ridings, supra note 13, at 420.
93 The income statement shows that process at a specific time period and the balance
sheet shows operating results at a specific point in time. See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN,
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 470-72 (3d ed. 2002).
14 Id. at 465.
95 An example of the value of assets at a specific point in time is the cost of asset
procurement; an example of the going concern value based on future earning power while
having a specific point in time is the standard DCF approach or earning return value (Value
of Return on Earning = Average Profit - Capitalization Rate).
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confusion, the following classifications are made in distinguishing the value
as an assemblage of assets 96 from the value as a going concern: (i) the
corporate value should be considered a continuously operating entity, i.e.,
value as a going concern; 98 (ii) the value should be calculated as an
assemblage of assets, meaning the collective value of all the corporate
assets not used in connection with generating earnings; 99 (iii) the value
must be treated as an orderly disposition, whose premise is on the voluntary
disposition of the corporation and where all the corporate assets are
separated and sold individually; and (iv) the value essentially becomes a
forced liquidation where the corporate assets, at the liquidation value, are
separated and sold individually through forced liquidation. 100
Another question that arises is, in the absence of an actual sale, should
the liquidation be considered as taking place at a fixed time over a period of
time, along with expenses?
In the United States, it is clear that assets and corporate value are not
valued at a fixed point in time. 101 The issue in Korea is whether or not
corporate reorganization law should adopt a policy of using a fixed point in
time as the standard in computing corporate value. Such a question arises
as the DRBA sets commencement time for the corporate reorganization
proceeding as the standard by which to appraise corporate assets and
liabilities value. 102 The list of assets and the balance sheet do not clearly
make reference to the standard time for evaluation of the liquidation and
going concern values. 1
0 3
96 For distinctions between valuation as an assemblage of assets and as a going
concern, see Caplin, supra note 41, at 774.
97 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
98 See In re Taffi, 96 F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 2478 (1997). This concept is based on the premise that the corporation continues its
business and the value of the corporation shall be made as a collection of live assets.
99 Id. See also Stan Bernstein, Susan H. Seabury & Jack F. Williams, Squaring
Bankruptcy Valuation Practice with Daubert Demands, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 161,
174 (2008) (noting that if accounting principles are loosely regulated sometimes "a
significant portion of the debtor's value may arise from a consideration of intangible assets
not recorded on the debtor's balance sheet, an asset greatly discounted or simply removed in
its entirety where a liquidation measure is employed.").
100 See Inho Chung, Hoi-sa-jung-ri-ki-up (beop-jung-kwan-ri-ki-up)-eui ga-chi-
pyeong-ga-eh-kwan-han-yeon-gu [An Empirical Study on the Valuation of the Companies
under In-Court Reorganization Procedures] 24-30 (2002) (S. Korea) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Kwangwoon University) (on file with author).
101 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 34, at 39 (introducing various court decisions
in valuation timing).
102 When an appraiser evaluates corporate assets, there are two elements to be
considered: the discount rate and the amount of cash it generates. See The Valuation
Proceedings Under Sections 303(c) and 306 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973, 531 F.Supp. 1191, 1225 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1982).
103 In the United States, this issue is also debated. See, e.g., Novikoff & Jacobs,
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As the valuation of both liquidation value and going concern value
must also be based on the value of assets, the commencement day of the
reorganization proceeding shall be the standard time. 10 4 However, the
bankruptcy court must continue to evaluate the liquidation value and the
going concern value at each stage of the corporate reorganization
proceeding, 105 as well as the order for filing and approval of the
reorganization plan. 106 If it is considered imperative to revise items of the
valuation made at the commencement of the corporate reorganization
proceeding, this will result in the continuation of the fixed policy.
However, as the liquidation value and the going concern value keep
changing, recalculation of the liquidation value and going concern value
may be required. Thus, in actuality, corporate reorganization law in Korea
does not reflect a policy of valuation on a fixed date.
B. Characteristics of the Balance Sheet
With regard to the preparation of a balance sheet, Korean bankruptcy
law states that every custodian shall prepare the inventory and balance sheet
at the time that the rehabilitation proceedings commence. 107
The balance sheet and the income statement are clearly distinguishable
on legal grounds as well as from the perspective of the concerned
corporation, the preparer, and at the place of exhibition. In corporate
reorganization practice, since the balance sheet is not separately indicated,
which can lead to mutual conflicts, the legal ground, the concerned
corporation, the preparer, and the place of the exhibition for preparation
must be clearly recognized and separated at the outset.
1 08
If that was the case, the balance sheet, which was made for reporting to
the court and prepared by the receiver following the confirmation of the
reorganization plan, should be in accordance with the financial and
managerial accounting rules. After the confirmation of the reorganization
supra note 85, at 404 (citing Braucher, Getting it for you Wholesale: Making Sense of
Bankruptcy Valuation of Collateral after Rash, 902 Dick. L. Rev. 763, 787-92 (1998), noting
that the time lag inherent in a Chapter 11 case between the time the case is filed and the time
the plan is proposed gives rise to very different valuation concerns).
104 Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 1061, 1062 (1985) ("The Bankruptcy Code... disregards time in the valuation of
liabilities.").
105 See DRBA, supra note 1, arts. 42, 220 & 285.
106 It is the same in the United States that "[t]he need to attribute value to an asset or
a business [also] can arise repeatedly at numerous stages during the course of a Chapter 11
Case." Novikoff& Jacobs, supra note 86, at 399.
107 DRBA, supra note 1, art. 91.
108 See Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 174 (noting that different
considerations may cause "[t]he amount of liabilities reflected on the balance sheet may
increase or additional liabilities not recorded on the financial statements may be included.").
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plan, should the receiver prepare the balance sheet according to the
financial accounting standards or Chapter 11 of bankruptcy law? Of
course, the receiver may follow the statute rather than the financial
accounting standard because the balance sheet is just prepared for this
limited purpose. However, even if the basis for the preparation is different,
there is no reasonable legal basis for maintaining the single preparation
method during the corporate reorganization proceeding.
Upon commencement of the corporate reorganization proceeding, the
balance sheet may not be prepared under corporate law but must use the
balance sheet set out in Article 91109 of the DRBA and be based on the
prescribed valuation under Article 90 of the corporate reorganization law.
1 10
When valuing the fixed assets for the operation under corporate
reorganization law, the prescribed valuation of fixed assets outlined in
Article 31 of the Commercial Act does not apply.1 1 The receiver should
prepare the valuation report according to generally accepted accounting
principles. 112
The problem is that there are cases where there is no continuity
between the balance sheet prepared and submitted to the bankruptcy court
by the receiver and the balance sheet prepared by the receiver and submitted
to the Stock Exchange (KRX) and the Financial Supervisory Service
(FSS). 113
109 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110 DRBA, supra note 1, arts. 90-91 (providing that the receiver shall, upon
inauguration, and without delay, appraise the value of all properties belonging to the
corporation. In this case, the corporation shall take part in the appraisal, except in cases
where there is a possibility of delay).
111 Commercial Act art. 31, Statues of Korea, Vol. 4 (1997), providing that:
[A]ssets to be entered in an account book shall be valued as follows: 1. The current
assets shall be valued on the basis of the acquisition cost, manufacturing cost or
current price: Provided, that if the current price is remarkably lower than the
acquisition cost or manufacturing cost, the valuation shall be made according to
the current price; and 2. The fixed assets shall be valued on the basis of the
acquisition cost or manufacturing cost, less a reasonable depreciation, but when
any unexpected diminution has occurred, a reasonable reduction shall be made.
112 It varies depending on the subject matter. See ASWATH DAMODARAN,
INVESTMENT VALUATION-TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY
ASSET 28-30 (2d ed. 2002); CARL S. WARREN, JAMES M. REEVE, & PHILIP E. FESS,
FINANCIAL & MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 366-67 (6th ed. 1999).
113 See DRBA, supra note 1, arts. 91 & 93; Joo-sik-hoe-sa-eui-oeh-boo-gam-sa-eh-
kwan-hahn-beob-ryul Je-8314-ho, Je-8-jo [Art. 8 of the Act on External Audit of Stock
Companies, Act No. 8314] (Mar. 29, 2007) (amended 2008) (S. Korea); Joo-sik-hoe-sa-eui-
oeh-boo-gam-sa-eh-kwan-hahn-beob-ryul-si-haeng-ryung Je-20033-ho, Je-7-jo-eui-2 [Art.
7(2) of the Decree of the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, Decree No. 20033]
(Apr. 27, 2007) (amended 2008) (S. Korea).
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This creates a problem since the receiver prepares the balance sheet
and submits it to the bankruptcy court, based on the reorganization trustee's
valuation at the commencement of the corporate reorganization proceeding.
On the other hand, the balance sheet prepared by the receiver and submitted
to the KRX and the FSS uses independent audits on a half-yearly or yearly
standard. 11 4  Generally courts appoint the reorganization trustee from an
accounting firm different from the corporate inspector. The receiver must
prepare the balance sheet in accordance with the standard for asset
valuation under corporate reorganization law, maintaining continuity and
having an independent audit, but must insist on the use of the financial
accounting standard as the general practice.
What are the reasons for such a huge discrepancy between the assets
on the balance sheet when prepared by the different agencies?
One exemplary statute may provide the answer. In Japan, in a case
where the receiver prepares the balance sheet on the day of the confirmation
of the reorganization plan as well as the time set by the bankruptcy court,
the statute requires that the value under the corporate reorganization law
should be regarded as the amount of the acquisition cost.11 5 If a provision
similar to Japan were used, there would be no problem of conflicts or
inconsistency.
C. Assets
The following will look at assets as they relate to going concern value
and liquidation value under corporate reorganization law. "
1 6
The term "asset" under the DBRA is clearly different from the
financial accounting standard used in the United States.11 7 Therefore, the
term must be considered in light of the going concern value as a "flow"
rather than a "stock" concept.
114 See Joo-sik-hoe-sa-eui-oeh-boo-gam-sa-eh-kwan-hahn-beob-ryul Je-8314-ho, Je-8-
jo [Art. 8 of the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, Act No. 8314] (Mar. 29, 2007)
(amended 2008) (S. Korea); Joo-sik-hoe-sa-eui-oeh-boo-gam-sa-eh-kwan-hahn-beob-ryul-si-
haeng-ryung Je-20033-ho, Je-7-jo [Art. 7 of the Decree of the Act on External Audit of Stock
Companies, Decree No. 20033] (Apr. 27, 2007) (amended 2008) (S. Korea).
"l5 See Art. 182 cl. 1. Corporate Reorganization Law, Vol. II, Law No. 154 (Dec. 13,
2002) (Japan).
116 One commentator simply defined "liquidation value as financing of the same
asset." According to this definition, liquidation value and cost of reproduction are at opposite
ends of the value spectrum. See KING, supra note 88, at 12.
117 Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 174 ("Generally, the expert
must determine the value of the debtor's assets and amount of liabilities using a going
concern measure unless it is more likely than not that the business is a failed concern, and,
thus, a liquidation measure may be more appropriate.").
118 One commentator eloquently argues that "the going concern is again the object of
valuation. Because regardless of the method used, whether it is the frank appraisal or the
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In valuing a corporation, the next inquiry is the relationship between
the concepts of assets and liabilities' 9 under financial accounting,
management accounting, and tax accounting in corporate reorganization
law. With the reorganization trustee or valuation experts raising the issue
of financial accounting standards, what method should be used to settle
conflicts resulting from the discrepancy between assets and liabilities on the
balance sheet prepared by either the debtors 120 or receivers and those of
financial accounting and management accounting? 121
According to the Supreme Court of Korea, in evaluating corporate
assets under Article 90 of the DRBA, the going concern value is based not
on the premise of liquidation and bankruptcy of the corporation (i.e., the
liquidation value based on corporate liquidation or disposal) but on the
maintenance and restructuring of the corporation (i.e., the premise of
continuance of the corporation). 2 2  However, profitability of the
corporation is affected because the sale value of each individual asset is
based upon the going concern value. The valuation method using earning
revenue is the standard method. 1
23
infamous judicial sale, a valuation problem is involved." Caplin, supra note 41, at 776.
119 DRBA, supra note 1, art. 36 provides that an application for the commencement
of reorganization proceedings shall include the following matters: total stocks issued by the
corporation, the amount of capital, assets and liabilities, and other matters relating to
financial status. Furthermore, DRBA, supra note 1, art. 146(3) provides that if the total
liabilities of a corporation exceed its total assets at the commencement of reorganization
proceedings, the shareholders shall not have any voting rights; provided, however, that this
shall not apply where the total liabilities of a corporation at the time of presenting a modified
reorganization plan referred to in Art. 282 exceed its total assets. DRBA, supra note 1, art.
205(2) also provides that reduction of capital referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
determined, taking into account the assets, liabilities, and earning power of a corporation.
Finally, DRBA, supra note 1, art. 205(3) provides that if the total liabilities of a corporation
at the time of commencement of reorganization proceedings exceed its total assets, the
reduction of capital shall be determined in such a manner that writes off not less than half of
the corporation's issued stocks.
120 One commentator pointed out that "the rigid approach has resulted in laxness in
the area of valuation: and has in many instances resulted in severe overvaluation." Frye,
supra note 15, at 406.
121 This issue arises because "the appraiser discretionally applied the methodologies
that certain items are sometimes to be omitted in determining value and other considerations
are specifically to be taken into account." Childs, supra note 40, at 89.
122 Judgment of May 28, 1991, 90 Ma 954 (Supreme Court of Korea) (S. Korea).
123 Earning revenue (Ew) can develop as follows:
C 1, C2, ... Cn = 1 st year, 2nd year,. . . nth year net profit.
Ew = GlI(l+i) + G2/(l+i) 2+ + GnI(l+i) n + L/(I+i) n
In case, GI = G2 = ... Gn=G
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But if the valuation method can express an objective value, taking into
consideration the continuance of the corporation, it is considered sufficient
even if the valuation method follows the ratification value by the cost of
new procurement according to its kind and characteristics. 124
If a corporation were reorganized during what is considered a bubble
economy, 125 how can corporate value be evaluated? Court decisions to
approve a valuation discarding reproduction costs and rate-making bases
may have been different if the valuation was based on a depressed or
inflated earnings period. 126 In valuing the corporation, the appraised value
can be set by integrating the calculations based on the cost of new
procurement, the fair market price, and the earning power instead of
following a single standard. 1
27
Should the abnormal and normal economic situations be differentiated
in evaluating the corporate value? 128 In the case of a corporation in normal
operation or a corporation under temporary financial distress, there is not
much difference between the going concern values under the stock concept
and the flow concept. 129  However, in Korea, most reorganizing
Ew = G/(I+i) + G/(I+i) 2+... + G/(I+i) n + L/(I+i) n
= G [(l+i) .- l]/(l+i) "i + L/(l+i) n
Mathematization requires (1+i) n +1 as the common denominator and (I+i) 1 +
(1+i) 2 + (1i) + ... + (1+i) ' in the numerator, which makes (1+i) {(1+i)n -1}
{(1+i)-1 } formula, and the binomial theorem process should be inserted.
Here, i is the capitalization rate, L is the nth year corporate liquidation amount.
When n is infinite, Ew equals Gli. This considers the corporation's economic life
span in perpetutity. It is an idelogical concept that does not coincide with
numerical statements.
124 Judgment of May 28, 1991, 90 Ma 954 (Supreme Court of Korea) (S. Korea).
125 An economic bubble (sometimes referred to as a "market bubble," a "financial
bubble," or a "speculative mania") refers to a market condition in which the prices of
commodities or asset classes increase to absurd or unsustainable levels (that no longer reflect
utility of usage and purchasing power). See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: WHEN BUBBLES BURST 2 (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/pdf/chapter2.pdf.
126 Caplin, supra note 41, at 783 (citing Atlanta, B. & C.C.R. v. U.S., 296 U.S. 33
(1935)).
127 See AKIRA MIKAZUKI ET AL., JOKAIKAISHAKOSEIHO HA [CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION LAW VOL. 3] 105 (2003) (Japan).
128 One commentator argues that "the going concern value of the corporation is
determined by capitalizing estimated earnings at a rate appropriate to the economic setting in
which the corporation is operating." Frye, supra note 15, at 400-01.




corporations have much lower going concern values under the flow concept
as compared to the stock concept.
In theory, the definition of an asset under corporate reorganization law
could be defined in any of the following ways: (i) it is the same as in the
commercial balance sheet; (ii) it is the liquidation value; (iii) it is the
liquidation value in bankruptcy and the going concern value in corporate
reorganization; (iv) it is the going concern value; (v) it is the market price
or the cost of new procurement; (vi) it is the value calculated according to
the earning return method; (vii) it is the mutual standard between the
liquidation value and the going concern value; or (viii) when the
corporation continues its operation, it is by the going concern value and
when the corporation ceases the operation, it is by the liquidation value. 1
31
Accordingly, the possible means of asset evaluation under the DRBA
are as follows: (i) the use of a commercial balance sheet; (ii) the use of a
special balance sheet (liquidation value theory, going concern value theory,
cumulative application theory, or effective value theory); (iii) no use of the
balance sheet (earning revenue theory or combination method of the
difference between the earning revenue method and the actual value); or
(iv) the special balance sheet hybrid method (weighted standard theory,
two-step theory, or modified two-step theory). 13
2
130 See infra Appendix II.
13 1 According to the financial accounting literature, "[a]ssets are economic resources
that are expected to help generate future cash inflows or prevent future cash outflows."
CHARLES T. HORNGREN, GARY L. SUNDEM & JOHN A. ELLIOTT, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING 9 (8th ed. 2002). Simply, "[t]he resources owned by a business are called
assets." WARREN ET AL., supra note 112, at 11.
132 In Korean law, asset valuation exists in only two statutes. Under the title of the
Appraisal of Fixed Assets Used for Business, Article 94 of the DRBA provides that:
(1) Every custodian shall, when he/she prepares the debtor's asset inventory and
balance sheet, prepare them according to accounting practices that are generally
recognized as being fair and appropriate. (2) The provisions of subparagraph 2 of
Article 31 of the Commercial Act shall not apply to the case of paragraph (1).
3 KOREA LEGISLATION RESEARCH INST., STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1997).
Under the title of the Principles for Valuation of Assets, Article 31 of the Commercial Act
(Act No. 8532 Aug. 3, 2007) states that:
Assets to be entered in an account book shall be valued as follows:
1. The current assets shall be valued on the basis of the acquisition cost,
manufacturing cost or current price: Provided, That if the current price is
remarkably lower than the acquisition cost or manufacturing cost, the valuation
shall be made according to the current price; and, 2. The fixed assets shall be
valued on the basis of the acquisition cost or manufacturing cost, less a reasonable
depreciation, but when any unexpected diminution has occurred, a reasonable
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In the United States, "[i]n liquidation, which is governed by Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code, the assets of the corporation are sold, either
piecemeal or as a going concern."' 33 On the contrary, the reorganization
regulated by Chapter 11 is an alternative plan to liquidation, and
ideologically it is regarded as a sale to such concerned parties as existing
creditors and shareholders. 134 In other words, "the fundamental difference
between reorganization and liquidation is that in a reorganization the firm's




Is the concept of liabilities the same as that of debts under corporate
reorganization law? In calculating the corporate value, should the liabilities
be calculated as the present value? If so, how can the present value of
liabilities be calculated? What discount rate is appropriate in calculating
the present value of the liabilities? 
136
Liability under corporate reorganization law is not the same as under
financial accounting standards. Generally, the same may be said with
respect to the sum of debts. Liabilities sometimes need to be discounted to
the present value and should be evaluated according to a certain standard. 1
37
The rationale for using present value here is that cash received on a future
distribution date is not equivalent in value to money received today. 1
38
In Korea the going concern value in a corporate reorganization
proceeding is defined as the value based on the premise that there is no
dissolution or liquidation of corporate assets and calls for the DCF approach
reduction shall be made.
4 KOREA LEGISLATION RESEARCH INST., STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (1997) (this
Article was wholly amended by Act No. 3724, Apr. 10, 1984).
133 Bebchuk, supra note 79, at 775.
134 It is because "[w]hen the firm is insolvent, ownership shifts to the creditors."
Lopucki, supra note 30, at 743.
135 "In a prototypical liquidation proceeding, for example, the firm's assets are sold
to third parties for cash or securities. They may be sold piecemeal, in blocks, or as a unit."
JACKSON, supra note 16, at 211.
136 "Quite often the valuation controversies in the corporate reorganization center on
the question of the various rate to be chosen such as discount rate, interest rate, growth rate,
rate of return, and others." Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1735-36.
137 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires that the "value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in
conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's
interest." 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(1) (West 2005).
138 See Pantaleo & Ridings, supra note 13, at 427; see also Francis G. Conrad,
Dot.coms in Bankruptcy Valuations under Title 11 or www.snipehunt in the Dark.noreorg
/noassets.com, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 417, 423 (2001).
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where the future revenue is discounted to the present value. 139 The term
"flow of revenue" indicated in the Rules should be interpreted as "cash flow
from genuine trade" in the case of corporate reorganization because the
DCF approach discounts future cash flow to the present value 140 but does
not discount the revenue to the present value.
This approach is based on the "principle of the present value," which
states that the value of an asset is the present value of the expected future
cash flow of the asset. 141 Such a value from the DCF approach only
evaluates the value of equity capital from the shareholders' standpoints and
is derived by discounting the future cash flow.142 In other words, the DCF
approach only considers the remaining cash flow after subtracting the
expenses and tax on the trade revenue, as well as the principal payment of
the debts.
Valuation of corporate reorganization is not a matter of a complicated
mathematical formula, but rather a reasonable judgment must be made,
based on a proper consideration of all relevant facts. 14 3  However,
sometimes a formula can give a clear understanding of complex issues. 144
From the entire corporation's standpoint, this approach takes into account
other parties with the right to claim, in addition to equity capital. It
discounts the expected future cash flow for the corporation. In other words,
it discounts the cash flow as the weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) 145 after paying all the expenses and tax from the trade revenue. 
146
139 Jae-pan-yeah-gyoo je-1219-ho (Jaemin 2006-5) [Korea S. Ct. Civil Trial Rule
(No. 1219) (Jaemin 2006-5)], art. 9, cl.2 (S. Korea).
140 See Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc. et al., 356 B.R. 364, 370 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
141 "It is the fundamental premise of valuation and financial investing that the value
of today of an asset is the present value of the future cash flows." KNG, supra note 88, at
33.
142 Israel Shaked & Allen Michel, The Mirant Valuation SAGA: Epic Battle of
Experts, 24-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 40, 41 (2006) (noting "Cash flows in a DCF model are
usually discounted at the company's weighted average cost of capital (WACC). As implied
by its name, the WACC is derived as the weighted average of the company's cost of equity
and cost of debt based on the company's capital structure.").
143 See Caplin, supra note 41, at 792.
144 We can easily obtain the value of equity capital from the formula below.
Value of Equity Capital = [Shareholders' Expected Cash Flow t/(l+Ke) t]
145 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 111-12.
FORMULA: WACC = Ke (E / E+D+PS) + Kd (D / E+D+PS) + K, (PS / E+D+PS);
WACC = (Cost of Debt x (1 - Tax Rate) x Debt to Equity Value) + (Cost of
Equity x Equity/Equity Value).
See In re Am. HomePatient, Inc. 298 B.R. 152, 176 n.21 (Bankr. M.D.Tenn., 2003).
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Med Diversified, Inc. 147 provides other formulas for valuation. One of
the other formulas decreases variables 48 and another increases variables. 49
Article 9(1) of the Korean S. Ct. Civil Trial Rule No. 1291, also
known as JaeMin 2006-5, cites the two formulas referenced above. 1
50
146 It can be represented by the formula below:
Corporate Value = [Expected Cash Flow of the Corporation / (I+WACC) t]
t=1
147 See In re Med Diversified, Inc., 346 B.R. 621 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).
148 FORMULA: in case K,, = 0, WACC = Ke (E / E+D) + KpS(D / E+D);
FORMULA: in case Kp, = 0, Kd = 0, WACC = Ke (E /E) = Ke; FORMULA: in case Ke = 0,
Kp = 0, WACC = Kd(D/D) = Kd
4 FORMULA: WACC = K (E / E+UD+SD+PS) + Kd (UD / E+UD+SD+PS) + Ksd
(SD / E+UD+SD+PS) + Kps (PS / E+UD+SD+PS). Here, WACC is weighted average cost
of capital; E is value of equity capital (shareholder), D is value of debts (creditor), UD is
value of unsecured debts, SD is value of secured debts, PS is value of preferred stocks
(preferred shareholder), K~d is cost of unsecured debts of others after tax, Kda is cost of
secured debts of others after tax, K, is cost of equity capital for shareholder component ratio
of equity capital in the capital raised.) Kd is cost of debt capital after tax = interest rate x (1 -
Corporate tax rate) and is the component ratio of debts in the capital raised.) K, is cost of
preferred stocks (preferred stock dividend - market value of preferred stock and the cost of
preferred shareholders' capital = the amount of dividend per preferred stock - the market
value of the preferred stock; the component ratio of preferred stocks in the capital raised.) E
is value of equity capital, D is value of debts (creditors), PS is value of preferred stocks
(preferred shareholder), and WACC is represented by the following formula: WACC=Re x E
/ V+Rd x (1-Corporate Tax rate) x D/V Here, E/V is proportion of equity and D/V is
proportion of debt. See In re Am. HomePatient, Inc. 298 B.R. at 176.
150 This is the present method of appraisal of liquidation value and going concern
value.
Present Value of Future Cash Flows= [C, / (l+r)I + C,+] /(l+r) n(r-g)]
t=1
[C1 / (l+r) '] + [C2 / (l+r) 2]... + [C / (l+r) "] + [C,+1 - (l+g) / (l+r)"1] +
[Cn+1 -(l+g) I / (l+r)+2] + [C,,+- (l+g) 3I / (l+r)"+s] + [C,+, - (l+g) -/(l+r) ]
If, C,=C2 =C 3 ... =C, andg=0
[C / (l+r)'] + [C/ (+r) 2] +... + [C / (l+r) n] + [C / (l+r)"+l] + [C / (l+r)"+2] +
[C/(l+r)"+3] +... + [C/ (l+r) ]
= C [(l+r) '-I] / (l+r) '].r
=C/r
Here, n is the presumed final year; Ct is the cash flow from the activity of the
genuine trade operation in the year t, C,,+, is the cash flow from activity of the
genuine trade operation in the year ,+,, r is the discount rate, t is the number of
years (from the presumed final year), g is the fixed growth rate.
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In sum, the present value of the future cash flow is equal to the present
value of the future cash flow plus the value of non-business assets.
E. Liquidation
If a corporation is too far gone to be financially reorganized, by statute
it must be liquidated. Generally, corporate liquidations are associated with
bankruptcy. A company may be liquidated in bankruptcy when all parties
concerned recognize that the continuation of the firm in a reorganized form
will not enhance its operating profits. 151 Liquidation in Korean law can be
divided into voluntary liquidation under the Commercial Act (Part V,
Corporation) and forced liquidation by a bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act. 1
52
In liquidating a corporation, is the sale of corporate assets allowed
only on a piece-by-piece basis through individual sale or is the bulk sale
method also permitted? 153 In calculating the liquidation value, should the
realized amount be acknowledged only by public auction? The bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding is based on the sale of individual assets by either
a liquidator or reorganization trustee, but does not preclude the sale of
assets through an auction. 54 There is not much difference between the
liquidation value and the going concern value as a stock concept if the
emphasis is on either the sale of assets individually or the sale of a
continuing business. However, if the emphasis is on the sale of assets
through an auction, there can be a drastic difference between the liquidation
value and the going concern value as a stock concept. In either case, the
rule of the best interest of the creditor should be applied. 1
55
The liquidation value of a reorganizing corporation refers to the sum of
all the values from the separate sale of all the individual assets of the
corporation that can be distributed to concerned parties as well as creditors
if the corporation is liquidated. 1
5 6
The value of the business assets of a corporation is based on the going
concern of the business. However, if a corporation loses its economic
151 See GAUGHAN, supra note 93, at 437.
152 CHIYONG LIM, PASANBUBYEONGU [Bankruptcy Law Research] 17, 19 (2d ed.
2006).
153 Sec. 365 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code supersedes U.C.C. Article 6 § 6-102(1)(C) to
allow bulk sales to occur within the reorganization process. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (West 2005).
There is a no similar provision in Korean law.
154 In the United States, the secured creditors, however, had the option of having the
property sold at public auction. See Ralph Adam Fine, Unjamming the "Cram-Down," 52
AM. BANKR. L. J. 335 (1978).
155 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 45.
156 So "[c]reditors cannot be forced to receive less in a Chapter 1 reorganization
than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation." Hicks, supra note 24, at 821.
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viability and confronts bankruptcy, it is necessary to evaluate the value of
assets based on the separate sale of all the individual assets to minimize the
economic loss. 157  The sale of assets value, then, is different from the
voluntary sales value because it is a distressed, reluctant sale. If there was a
fair market, the assets subject to liquidation could be sold at the fair market
price based on the highest and the best uses. However, because this is a
forced sale, it would be difficult to sell the assets at general fair market
prices. Therefore, the liquidation value is generally lower than the fair
market price (value in use), and when the assets are used for a special
purpose, the difference between the value in use 158 and the liquidation value
becomes even greater.
Notably, "liquidation value assumes company operations have ceased
and assets are sold individually or collectively in-groups." 159  The
comparison between the value in use according to the characteristics of
assets and the liquidation value is important to recognize.
For current assets, 160 there is not much difference between the value in
use and the liquidation value. Particularly for a cash deposit, where the use
is not limited and liquidity is secured, the value in use and the liquidation
value are the same. For trade receivables, there is a difference in value
because of the time required for collection and its feasibility.' 
61
The liquidation value of the inventory assets varies greatly depending
on the type and form of the inventory. In other words, the difference may
not vary much for the finished products if they are consumer products with
limited uses. 162 However, if the products are production goods, the
difference can be large because the purpose or use is limited. For the work
in process, there will be almost no liquidity' 6 1 if plant operation is no longer
possible due to the liquidation of the corporation. However, for raw
materials, the difference can be reduced depending on the likelihood of
transfer to another manufacturing business.1 64 For investment assets not
affected by insolvency such as bankruptcy, the difference will be a product
157 See supra text accompanying note 137.
158 KiNG, supra note 88, at 12 ("Appraisers use the term value in use to refer to the
replacement cost of an asset, less depreciation from all cases."). See also infra note 199 and
accompanying text.
159 See Conrad, supra note 13, at 426.
160 It can normally be turned into cash within one year.
161 See WARREN ET AL., supra note 112, at 279 ("The term receivables includes all
money claims against other entities, including people, business firms, and other
organizations .... Notes and accounts receivable that result from sales transactions are
sometimes called trade receivables.").





of the length of collection time. 161
Among tangible fixed assets such as land, buildings, or vehicles that
have a wide-use, there is not a liquidation problem. However, for special
purpose machines, there may be many restrictions on liquidity.166 Even if
assets have a wide-use, when the asset is large in size, it will require a
significant amount of time to dispose of and can be greatly affected if the
market is not actively pursued. It is stated in the Korean rules regarding
corporate liquidation f67 that the liquidation value of the tangible fixed assets
must be calculated by the discounted value of applying the average rate of
the contract price in the real estate tender proceeding of the court auction.
For intangible assets 168 and intellectual property, there is a huge
difference between the value in use and the liquidation value.'6 9 Though
the difference can vary depending on the degree of use, for the most part the
value is not recognized outside the corporation since it is created within the
corporation and used solely for business operations of the corporation. 1
70
As stated above, the liquidation value is evaluated differently
depending on the asset's characteristics. The liquidation value made by the
reorganization trustee also follows such a standard in the corporate
reorganization proceeding in Korea but it neglects the cost involved in
liquidation and the cost of time during the collection period. 171 The cost of
time for the collection period is very significant when comparing the
liquidation value to the going concern value. This is due to the fact that the
165 Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 171 ("A valuation reflects value
at a particular point in time and may change based on the premise and standard of value
employed.").
166 Id. at 194.
167 Jae-pan-yeah-gyoo je-1219-ho (Jaemin 2006-5) [Korea S. Ct. Civil Trial Rule
(No. 1219) (Jaemin 2006-5)], art. 9, cl.1 (S. Korea).
168 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 139, at 427 ("Intangibles can include the following:
patents; licenses; copyrights; formulas; trademarks; contract rights; domain name; trade
secrets; proprietary technology; customer lists; and software, which are owned or licensed.").
169 Id..
Cursory reviews of the Chapter 7 petitions of a few dot.coms show little or no
traditional inventory. This is not surprising considering the typical nature of the
business enterprises being operated by dot.coms. Consequently, it should be
anticipated that full service dot.coms will present the usual valuation problems
because of their lack of traditional inventory. If they do, they should be valued
using traditional inventory valuation methods.
170 See supra text accompanying note 99.
171 See Conrad, supra note 138, at 426 ("Liquidation assumes an orderly sale over a
reasonable time, with proper exposure to the market in order to obtain the highest price for
each asset. The valuation should consider the impact of selling costs, costs of holding assets
until sale, and other expenses.").
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going concern value is calculated by discounting the future cash flow to the
present value, whereas the liquidation value is the amount due from all the
assets that are sold now, collected in cash. 172  Therefore, if the cash
collection is delayed, there is a difference in costs in time in the timing of
the collection of claims by the creditors.
F. Contingent Debts
Another question that arises is how contingent claims,1 73 that can be
made only if one or more specified outcomes occur, should be treated in the
corporate reorganization proceeding. The calculation method for debts
under corporate reorganization law is distinguishable from the method
under the Financial Accounting Standards. The amount of the debts
marked as contingent claims by the financial accounting standards does not
fully ripen into an enforceable "right" or "claim" during the corporate
reorganization proceeding, and therefore must be determined at a later
date. 174 Thus, a question that arises in Korea is whether only reported
secured 175 and reported unsecured claims 176 should be recognized as
liabilities, or should rights also be recognized on unreported claims.
Although there is no specific rule, both should be recognized as liabilities.
Because valuation is a financial rather than a legal analysis, 177 those claims
must be reflected on the valuation report.
172 Financial theory explains that the value of the stock of a corporation equals all
expected future cash flows generated by the corporation and discounted by an appropriate
risk-adjusted rate. See Sudipto Bhattacharya, Corporate Finance and the Legacy of Miller
and Modigliani, 2-4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 135, 142 (1988).
173 One example is financial derivatives contracts. Financial derivatives are also
known as contingent claims since their payoffs are "contingent" upon the outcome of an
underlying asset variable. See FAS 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging
Activities.
174 Most frequently, the contingent liability arises among note issuer, endorser, and
payee. See, e.g., WARREN ET AL., supra note 112, at 293-93, 390-91.
175 Regarding reports on reorganization securities, DRBA, supra note 1, article
149(1) provides that any secured creditor who desires to participate in reorganization
proceedings shall report to the court his name and address, the details and cause of each
secured claims, the object and value of the claims, the amount of his voting right, and, if a
person other than the corporation is the debtor, that person's name and address, and shall
submit the evidentiary documents or certified copies or abstracts thereof, within the
reporting period prescribed by the court.
176 Regarding reports on reorganization claims, DRBA, supra note 1, article 148(1)
provides that any unsecured creditor who desires to participate in reorganization
proceedings, shall notify the court of: (i) his name and address; (ii) the details and cause of
the claim; (iii) the amount of voting rights; and (iv) where it is a claim with general rights of
preference an explanation to that effect, and submit to the court any evidentiary documents
or certified copies or abstracts thereof, within the period for report prescribed by the court.
177 See Conrad, supra note 138, at 420.
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III. VALUATIONS OF REORGANIZING CORPORATIONS
There are many conflicts of interest among the individual concerned
parties and within the class of creditors in the course of a bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding. Specifically, when creditors and shareholders
are calculating estimated future profit, the shareholders will try to set the
estimated profit as high as possible in order to protect the corporation from
bankruptcy. 78  At the same time, creditors will try to set the estimated
profit as low as possible in order to shorten the time to recover the claims
from the early stages of the proceeding. 79  Moreover, creditors can act
mutually and stand face to face in exercising "avoidance power"' 80 due to
gratuitous acts or preferential and fraudulent transfers for ex post facto
collateral. There is also the possibility of simple payment guarantees to
third party creditors and between secured and unsecured creditors since
there could be conflicts due to differentiated payment conditions.181 There
are many reasons why corporate value must be determined in a
reorganization proceeding, 82 but most of all, it is imperative to solve these
kinds of disputes.
A. Time and Subjects
Because an enterprise's value may be volatile during bankruptcy
178 See Alderson & Betker, supra note 35, at 4. Under a different perspective, some
researchers present other reasons why shareholders insist that the firm continue:
Once in Chapter 11 reorganization ... the shareholders may be reluctant to
liquidate, for two reasons. First, a 100% liquid asset structure would create strong
pressure for a settlement of claims according to the absolute priority rule, which
would reduce or eliminate the surplus claim of the stockholders. Second, the costs
of immediate liquidation could be very high if the secondary market is thin, either
because the assets are highly specialized or because the entire industry is distressed
and therefore illiquid. (internal citation omitted).
Id.
179 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and
Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 253 (1992) (insisting
that the reason why the absolute priority rule is not kept is because when there is a
possibility of the corporation reviving, the shareholders tend to delay agreeing to the
reorganization plan and when the plan is delayed, this results in further financial
deterioration and when the proceedings are shifted to Chapter 7, the creditors yield their
share to the shareholders out of the fear that the corporate value could further decrease).
180 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)-(b) (2005); DRBA, supra note 1, arts. 100-112.
181 This would violate the fair and equitable principle. Therefore, the court should
make its determination whether a plan of reorganization impaired a class of claims or interest
only after hearing evidence. See 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(7); DRBA, supra note 1, arts. 217-
218.
182 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 34.
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reorganization proceedings, timing plays a critical role in the outcome of
valuation.' 83 So the question must be asked, should valuation for going
concern value and liquidation value be determined at the time of
confirmation of the reorganization plan or after? The case law and statutes
fail to explain the standard point of time to be used when trying to
determine value. After confirmation of the reorganization plan, if the
liquidation value exceeds the going concern value while carrying out the
plan, should the reorganization proceeding be terminated on account of the
execution of the plan being impracticable?
Unlike in the United States, 184 under Korean law the bankruptcy court
must evaluate the going concern value and the liquidation value based on
the report prepared by the receiver and the reorganization trustee either at
the corporate reorganization proceeding commencement day or
thereafter. 1 85 Under these laws, it is, in fact, impossible in terms of time for
creditors or debtors to calculate the liquidation value and the going concern
value independently. On the contrary, corporate value is determined not at
the commencement of the corporate reorganization proceeding but at the
approval stage of the reorganization plan. Under this system, either
creditors or debtors can independently calculate the liquidation value and
going concern value, and the bankruptcy court can use such data to evaluate
the final corporate value when approving the corporate reorganization
plan. 186
As briefly mentioned earlier, there are four preconditions in
determining corporate value: (i) the value of continuing the business
operations of the corporation where the corporation is considered a
collection of live assets; (ii) the value of the assemblage of the assets on the
condition that the business will not continue operation; (iii) the value of the
business when the assets are individually separated and sold in an orderly
disposition; (iv) the liquidation value of the business and is based on the
premise that all the assets of a corporation are individually separated and
sold by forced liquidation (this value is generally lower than under
voluntary liquidation).1 8 7  Even for the same corporation, the valuation
result may differ depending on which valuation premise is used.
Therefore, choosing the premise behind the value is the most important
183 See Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 171 ("A valuation reflects
value at a particular point in time and may change based on the premise and standard of
value employed.").
184 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not specify the standard of time in corporate
valuation and thus courts vary in the time of valuation. See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note
33, at 39.
185 See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 90.
186 See Novikoff & Jacobs, supra note 85, at 422-27 (evaluating timing of valuation).
187 See SEOUL CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT, HOI-SA-JUNG-RI-SIL-MOO [THE PRACTICE OF
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION CASE] 103-11 (2001) (S. Korea).
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procedure in selecting the valuation method. Such a choice of premise of
value is generally decided by the transaction circumstances or the purpose
of the valuation but it is sometimes predetermined and presented to the
valuer. 
188
Everything has its individual value as defined by each person.'
89
There are several different common terms used to describe value. Some of
the most common terms include "fair market value,"1 90 "market value,"191
188 See SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A
BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 29 (3d ed. 1996).
189 Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation
in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REv. 357, 375 (2005). Trujillo states:
A valuer's valuation is independent when it is not influenced by other valuers'
valuation of the same item. For example, suppose a valuer bids on a painting that
she intends for her private use. Her valuation of the painting depends on her
personal tastes, her intended use of the painting, and other considerations that are
unique to her. If she learned that other valuers placed a different value on the
same painting, it might change her bidding strategy but would not change her
valuation.
Id. (citation omitted).
190 "Fair market value" is the price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is
willing to pay on the open market in an arm's-length transaction; the point at which supply
and demand intersect. See Black's Law Dictionary 1549 (7th ed. 1999). "In defining FMV,
each party shall have reasonable knowledge of all relevant facts." KING, supra note 88, at 4
& 32. See also AMERICAN SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS, BUSINESS VALUATION STANDARDS 25
(2002), noting that:
Fair Market Value ("FMV") is the most widely accepted value in valuation and is
stated as the transaction price at which both the willing seller and willing buyer
will agree to do business without any forced actions and with sufficient knowledge
about the service or commodity. Fair Market Value is the price, expressed in
terms of cash equivalents, at which property would change hands between a
hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller,
acting at arm's length in an open and unrestricted market, when neither is under
compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts.
See also Conrad, supra note 138, at 422 (noting that the terms "willing seller" and "willing
buyer" refer to sellers and buyers who are engaged in the business not because of some
special motives but because of mutual needs. FMV is the value used widely in real estate
appraisal).
191 "Market value" is the current quoted price at which investors buy or sell a share
of common stock or a bond at a given time. It can be represented as the market
capitalization plus the market value of debt. Sometimes it is referred to as "total market
value." See Stuart C. Gilson, Edith Hotchkiss & Richard S. Ruback, Valuation of Bankrupt
Firms, 787 PLI/CoMM 467, 471 (1999), noting that:
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"fair value," 192 "true value," "investment value," 1
93 "intrinsic value," 94
"fundamental value,"195 "insurance value," 196  "book value,"'97 "use
In the context of securities, market value is often different from "book value"
because the market takes into account future growth potential. Most investors who
use fundamental analysis to pick stocks look at a company's market value and then
determine whether or not the market value is adequate or if it's undervalued in
comparison to its book value, net assets, or some other measure.
192 "Fair value" is a legal term applied to certain transactions and it is the value
serving as the legal standard when stock owners have different opinions on the value. If the
concerned minority parties are forced to receive stocks lower than the appropriate price
when the reorganizing corporation is merged or sold, they are given the right to receive the
fair value of the stock. In other words, the fair value refers to the appropriate price that
serves as the legal standard for mutual interests.
193 "Investment value" is the value to a specific investor due to the individual's
investment desire and is distinguished from the FMV which is impersonal and separated.
The FMV is not limited to some special buyers or sellers, but it is the value by
understanding, discretion, and motive on the hypothetical transaction in the market. See
CHICAGO APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 586 (10th ed. 1992).
Investment value is different from FMV in terms of future earning power, the degree of
understanding the risk, taxation, and the synergism with other variables. "Investment Value"
is derived from discounting the economic revenue method but the FMV can be substituted if
the market players accept it. However, if investment value exceeds FMV, unless there is an
investor with a higher price than the fair market price between the buyer groups, the owner
of the commodity will not sell it at the fair market price. Moreover, since the investment
value is the balanced fair market price by joint investors and such consensus is derived from
the equilibrium between demand and supply, it is not completely separated from FMV.
194 "Intrinsic value" is the inherent value of a thing, without any special features that
might alter its market value. The intrinsic value of a silver coin, for example, is simply the
value of the silver within it. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1549 (7th ed. 1999).
195 The "fundamental value" is the analytical value determined by the interpretation
of analysts but not by the individual characteristics of certain investors.
196 "Insurable values are measured usually based on the cost of reproduction." KING,
supra note 88, at 12.
197 Generally, "book value" is the value at which an asset carries on a balance sheet.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (7th ed. 1999).
Determination of price by book value appears to have been used more often than
any other method. It is simple and certain and reflects, in part at least, annual
changes in the value of the shareholder's equity. It seldom reflects actual value:
fixed assets are usually carried at their cost, less depreciation .... If book value is
used, it should be recognized that it is likely to be lower than actual value.
Childs, supra note 40, at 91. However, today more complex methodologies are applied in
valuations. For modernized valuation skills and techniques, see KOLLER ET AL., supra note




value,"'198 "collateral value,"' 199 and "ad valorem value." Value measures
are classified as "fair market value," "investment value," "intrinsic
value ,,200 "fundamental value," or "fair value" according to the purpose of
the valuation and the interests of the valuer.20 1  In addition, different
valuation methods require unique information and procedures for various
assets.20 2 In light of the varied terminology and valuation schemes, what
terminology can be applied appropriately in the valuing process?
There is a striking difference between the United States and Korea in
valuing disputes regarding the role of the appraiser. In the United States, to
determine the credibility of expert witnesses, courts look to things such as
"the appraiser's education, training, experience, familiarity with the subject
of the appraisal, manner of conducting the appraisal, testimony on direct
and cross examination, and overall ability to substantiate the basis for the
valuation presented., 20 3 However, these are all prerequisite requirements in
Korea, and the Korean court has adopted a lottery system to appoint
204
appraisers from a group of registered appraisers in bankruptcy court.
198 "Use value" is a value established by the utility of an object instead of its sale or
exchange value. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1550 (7th ed. 1999).
199 Sometimes "collateral value" refers to "going concern value," "replacement
value," or "retail value." See Owen W. Katz, Valuation of Secured Claims in a Bankruptcy
Reorganization: Eating with the Hounds and Running with the Hares, 100 COM. L.J. 320,
321 (1995). "Collateral value: Estimate of value of borrower's pledged collateral as
determined by appraisal. If marketable securities are pledged, the lender is restricted by
Federal Reserve Board regulations on margin lending." Answers.com,
http://www.answers.com/topic/collateral-value (last visited Dec. 31, 2007).
200 The "intrinsic value," calculated by closely analyzing the contents of assets,
earning power, and other factors in stock analysis, is regarded as the proper price of the
stock. In other words, it refers to the amount that investors acknowledge as genuine or real
on the equity security by analyzing the available variables and, when other investors come to
the same conclusion, it becomes the FMV. The method for calculating the intrinsic value is
to use the DCF approach as a standard. In order to make an investment decision on a stock,
the analyst reviews the expected revenue and distribution as well as the capital structure and
management competency and deducts the intrinsic value and compares the value with that in
the spot market. The purpose of calculating such an intrinsic value for a stock is to preclude
the difference between the FMV of the stock and the intrinsic value. If the FMV calculated
by the analyst is lower than the intrinsic value, the analyst will recommend buying the stock
and if the FMV is higher than the intrinsic value, he will recommend selling the stock.
Through such a process, both sellers and buyers of stocks draw mutual consensus in the
market and such a deduced price will consistently change accordingly, as the time and
circumstances change. See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 85-96, 433-34.
201 See PRATT ET AL., supra note 188, at 23.
202 See DAMODARAN, supra note 112, at 1-6.
203 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 64. The court considered the same set
of factors to evaluate the credibility of an expert witness appraiser in Am. HomePatient, Inc.,
298 B.R. at 177-79.
204 See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 87(l)-(4).
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Thus, there are neither battles in the valuation hearings 2° 5 nor issues
concerning whether scientific expert testimony is relevant and reliable (and
therefore admissible) in Korean courts. 20 6 The court-appointed appraiser
only has a duty to report at the creditors' meeting and at court. If the court
decides the report is reasonably unreliable, it can, in its discretion, appoint
another registered appraiser after subjectively examining the expert.2 °
B. Valuation of Secured Claims
A threshold issue is whether secured claims should be evaluated based
on the assets or the going concern value. One commentator argues:
In the absence of clear statutory instruction and legislative intent, one
is forced to look at the alternatives in the context of the Code and to
determine which seem to lead to a more reasonable result. Valuation
of collateral at "going concern" or "retail" levels for purpose of a
reorganization may have the satisfying effect of preventing debtors
from potentially eating with hounds and running with hares, but its
logic is difficult to reconcile with the interpretation and application
of other provisions in the Code. It also appears unfair to the
unsecured creditors.20 8
Generally, the type of security is often of a different quality, bearing
different rates of interest.209  In corporate reorganization proceedings in
Korea, secured claims have been valued using the going concern value as a
stock concept. 210 As a result, problems could occur with corporate value
distribution methods when the going concern value as a stock concept and
the going concern value as a flow concept do not coincide.2 11 Such
problems become more salient at the time of setting the cram-down
212
provision.
Since the revision in corporate reorganization law in Japan, the value
of a secured claim is determined at the time the reorganization commences,
on the premise that the corporation will continue its operations. In these
205 See supra notes 70, 123-127 and accompanying text.
206 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
207 See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 87(5).
208 Katz, supra note 199, at 354.
209 See Caplin, supra note 41, at 777.
210 Judgment of May 28, 1991, 90 Ma 954 (Supreme Court of Korea).
211 In the United States, "[t]he choice of the valuation standard can have a significant
impact on the size of the secured claim" and can also impact the junior mortgagee's status.
Katz, supra note 199, at 321. Even though U.S. Bankruptcy Rule 3012 provides courts
discretion to determine the value of securities, it does not specify valuation methods. See
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012.
212 Regarding approval in dissenting classes, there are four choices of cram-down in
the DRBA. See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 244(1).
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cases, the going concern value is most often considered a flow concept.
213
In this interpretation, there can be criticism that the right of the secured
creditors is underestimated.21 4
In Korea, as settled secured claims are not all repaid and the rights on
the settled secured claims can be adjusted,215 it does not seem necessary to
settle the secured claims by the standard of the going concern value by
revising the law. However, an issue that still arises is whether the value of
the secured claim remains permanent once an evaluation is made. When
there is a change in the value of the subject matter of collateral following
the reorganization plan upon a change in market situation, is there any
ground for reevaluation of the secured claim?
After the secured claims are recognized and once adjustment has been
made against such claims, it is the general rule for secured claims to expire
by only remaining a priority during the repayment period.2 16  In reality,
however, most reorganization plans that have been filed without such
changes instead continue to have secured claims. If the secured claims are
treated as terminated, there would be no problem of having to reevaluate the
subject matter whose value changes afterward.
213 See Matsushita Junichi, Asset Valuation in the Corporate Reorganization
Proceeding-Focusing on the Price of the Subject of the Secured Claims, No. 1212 JURIST 38,
(Nov. 15, 2001). But see Art. 2(10) & 83(2) of the Japanese Corporate Reorganization Act
of 2002.
214 According to the supplemental explanation on the draft outline of the revision to
the Corporate Reorganization Act, it might be damaging to a secured creditor if the corporate
value, under the premise that corporation continues its business, is less than the liquidation
value. Furthermore, it is against procedural economy to have a dispute with a secured
creditor. Thus, no arguments have arisen advocating the revision of these provisions. See
Yun, supra note 63, at 15.
215 Korean law has not adopted the absolute priority rule. The scope of the
modification is only restricted by the fair and equitable treatment doctrine. See Rollinson et.
al., supra note 55 and accompanying text.
216 Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be
Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 777, 824 (2007).
In a reorganization, creditors receive claims against the reorganized company in
exchange for their original claims against the firm. The plan of reorganization
divides all the creditors into different classes, with all the members of a particular
class holding substantially similar claims against the bankrupt firm. Further, the
plan determines the structure of the new claims received by each class in exchange
for the original claims. The new claims against the firm received by a class might
not be the same type of claims as the original claims held by the class.
Id.
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C. Methodologies
Generally, corporations can be valued in many different ways and "the
reorganization valuation process necessarily relies on informed but inexact
predictions and estimations. ' 217 Thus, one commentator argues that "the
valuation of the corporation often is not realistic, with the result that the
securities issued by the reorganized corporation fail to live up to the values
assigned to them."1 8
In the United States, the three generally accepted approaches for
valuation of the debtor corporation and its assets are the: (i) Market
Comparison Approach; (ii) Comparable Transaction Approach; and (iii)
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Approach.21 9
On the other hand, in Korea, the basic valuation methods are classified
into three different approaches: (i) DCF Approach (under the flow concept);
(ii) Relative Valuation Method (under the stock concept); and (iii)
Conditional Claims Valuation Method.220
217 See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1731.
218 See Frye, supra note 15, at 397.
219 See Am. HomePatient, Inc., 298 B.R. at 174; see also Oneida Ltd., et al., 351 B.R.
79, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2006). In In re Mirant Corp., 334 B.R. 800, 815 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.
2005), the court accepted four methods of valuation for an energy merchant and summarized
them as follows:
First, one may determine a value by multiplying Mirant Group's free cash flow by
a factor based on comparable companies (the "Comparable Method"). Second,
one may discount Mirant Group's projected cash flows to a present value (the
"DCF Method"). Third, one might arrive at a value based upon transactions
involving comparable assets (the "Transactions Method"). Finally, one may
value an energy merchant based upon a calculation of a value per megawatt of
capacity (the "Capacity Method").
See also Trujillo, supra note 189, at 383 (reporting valuation model based on empirical
survey).
220 Regarding liquidation value and the going concern value, Jae-pan-yeah-gyoo je-
1219-ho (Jaemin 2006-5) [Korea S. Ct. Civil Trial Rule (No. 1219) (Jaemin 2006-5)], art. 9
(S. Korea) states that:
The valuation methods for the going concern value are the corporate value method
by the standard of the amount of net corporate assets, the cash flow method that
discounts the future cash flow of the corporation to the present value and the
relative valuation method in which the stock prices of the similar listed
corporations set the standard to which the size of the net assets and that of net
profit are compared to estimate the corporate value.
For a corporation that applies for the decision on the commencement day of the
corporate reorganization proceeding, the liquidation value is estimated by the
standard of the net assets and the application of the relative valuation method or
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The DCF Approach takes the present value of the expected future cash
flow from the value of the assets. 22' The Relative Valuation Method
estimates the value of assets by analyzing the value of the assets compared
by the common variables of net profit, cash flow, book value,222 and sales.
The Conditional Claims Valuation Method estimates the value of assets
having similar characteristics of options by using the option price valuation
model.223
1. The DCF Approach
Corporate value can be represented by V = I PV (Cash flow), (PV =
present value).22 4 The required information for the valuation of corporate
value by the DCF approach includes the following: the size of cash flow,
the durability of cash flow, and the size of the cost of capital. 225
the corporate asset value method is considered inappropriate as it is difficult to
apply the proper level of the stock price depending on the degree of default.
221 See Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REv.
193, 203 (2007).
222 See Childs, supra note 40, at 92 ("Book value may prove useful as the indicator of
changes during the periods between more formal revaluations, if desirable."). But see
Conrad, supra note 138, at 421 ("Book value is generally not a reliable methodology in
bankruptcy. It is a quick and dirty method to capture a quick snapshot of the business, but
generally is not helpful in determining the worth of a business or potential recoveries for
creditors.").
223 See KOLLER ET. AL., supra note 53, at 15.
224 The concrete formula is as follows:
YX[(future value)/(( 1+i)')]
225 The cost of capital is used by shareholders to see if the corporation is delivering a
sufficient return, bearing in mind the risks of the business. It is the compensation that
corporations must provide investors in return for the use of their capital. When analyzing the
value of a stock, the relevant discount rate is not the interest rate, i, but the particular
corporation's cost of capital, r.
DCF is comprised of three components; however, when used to value the
reorganizational value of an entity it has four components. The four components
are:
(1) The present value of cash flows from operations or the asset during the period
in which cash flows are forecasted.
(2) The terminal or residual value remaining at the end of the forecast period.
(3) The appropriate discount rate.
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In Exide Technologies,226 the court stated:
The discounted cash flow ("DCF") analysis has been described as
a "forward-looking" method that "measure[s] value by
forecasting a firms' [sic] ability to generate cash." DCF is
calculated by adding together (i) the present value of the
company's projected distributable cash flows (i.e., cash flows
available to all investors) during the forecast period, and (ii) the
present value of the company's terminal value (i.e., value of the
firm at the end of the forecast period). 7
Also, in Cellular Information Systems, Inc. ,228 the court describes:
A DCF analysis, in general terms, depends on the following three
criteria:
(1) The size of the expected future cash streams to be generated
by the business;
(2) The discount rate employed in determining the present value
of these income streams;
(3) The terminal multiplier used to capture any residual value
remaining in the business at the end of the projection period.
22 9
The general procedure for corporate valuation in Korea is to forecast
the above information. This may be conceptualized as follows: first, the
economic life of the corporation is forecasted; second, the size of each
year's cash flow during the corporation's economic life is estimated; third,
the cost of capital is estimated for use as the discount rate for discounting
the present value; fourth, the cash flows generated during the economic life
of the corporation are discounted as the cost of capital and the total sum is
used to evaluate corporate value.230
According to the DCF approach, (i) the value of assets decreases as the
discount rate increases, (ii) the value of assets is an increasing function
relative to cash flow, (iii) the value of assets is an increasing function
(4) The present or current value of assets that will or will not be used or available
in the future operations of the debtor post-bankruptcy.
Conrad, supra note 138, at 423-24.
226 303 B.R. 48 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
227 Id. at 63 (internal citation omitted).
228 171 B.R. 926 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 1994).
229 Id. at 930.
230 See HYOSEOK KANG, WONHEUM LEE & JANGYEON CHO, KI-UP-GA-CHI-PYEONG-
GA-RON [VALUATION OF A CORPORATION] 106 (3d ed. 2000) (S. Korea).
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relative to the life of the assets, (iv) the value of assets generally decreases
as uncertainty increases, and (v) the present value is used to convert the
value of assets into a restricted time value.23'
One commentator argues that "valuation is a mixed question of law
and fact" 232 rather than an exact science. If so, when estimating future cash
flow, should the valuation be made on the assumption that the corporation
is in normal operation or in bankruptcy? In other words, when evaluating,
is the debt amount a zero-basis or is the corporation in a state of
insolvency? Should the cash flow statement be prepared on the premise
that the reorganizing corporation bears no financial responsibility? What
kinds of problems does the DCF approach entail in evaluating corporate
value?
233The DCF approach has numerous weaknesses. Corporations that
are financially distressed generally have a negative net profit and cash flow,
and with the expectation of future losses and a great likelihood of
insolvency, it is difficult to evaluate future cash flow. 23 4  Therefore, the
DCF approach is not appropriate for estimating value of a corporation prone
to bankruptcy because of the assumption that the corporation provides a
positive cash flow to investors and continues its operation indefinitely.
Because the present value of the cash flow is derived from the positive
future cash flow in the near future, it is difficult to apply the DCF approach
to an insolvent corporation whose expected cash flow for the next several
231 Those characteristics can be inferred from the issues with identifying assets,
timing, and specific cash flow projections of the firms. See Marc M. Levey, Buy In and Buy
Out Requirements Present Unusual Difficult Issues for Cost Sharing Agreements, 788
PLI!TAX 151, 168 (2007); Marc Weingarten, Is It Worth It? The Value of Delaware
Appraisal Rights to the Activist Investor, 1621 PLI/CoRP 363, 373 (2007) (noting "[tihe
courts have employed comparable company and transaction analyses, earnings and asset
value tests, and market benchmarks."); id (noting "[tihe DCF model relies on cash flow
projections, terminal value and a specified discount rate."); see also Jonathan M. Barnett,
Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional Curiosities, 33 J. CoRP. L.
95, 141 n.172 (2007).
Note that even the DCF analysis requires subjective judgment as to several
potentially determinant variables, including the discount rate (the rate at which
expected cash flows are discounted back to the present, taking into account
investment risk, opportunity cost of capital, and expected returns, so that the
higher the discount rate chosen, the lower the resulting valuation, and vice versa);
adjustments to "EBITDA" (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization); the EBITDA growth rates used to determine projected cash flows;
and the terminal value.
Id.
232 Novikoff & Jacobs, supra note 85, at 406.
233 See KING, supra note 88, at 99.
234 id.
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years is negative.
235
Since the net profit and cash flow of a cyclical business tend to follow
the economic situation, the economic slump, the recovery time, and the
uncertain economic situation should be forecasted in order to apply the
DCF approach.236  Ordinary income and the cash flow of the cyclical
business are certain to become stagnant during an economic slump. In
addition, the other indices such as the debt ratio and the rate of return on the
total assets will be affected.237 Thus, speculation and uncertainty illustrate
the difficulty in applying the DCF approach.
What is the basis for regarding the going concern value of the non-
business operation assets the same as the liquidation value? One primary
reason is that non-operating assets are generally considered cash.
2 
8
Furthermore, since the DCF approach reflects the values of all the assets
generating cash flow and does not reflect non-active assets, which do not
generate cash flow, a separate valuation must be made for these assets.239
Where a corporation has patent rights or options on products that do
not generate cash flow, estimating the future cash value may be impossible
because the corporation does not have past data, such as net profits or cash
flow growth rates.
During the reorganization procedure, the corporation is disposing of
some of its assets and acquiring other assets, which changes the capital
structure or the dividend policy. Since the reorganization of a corporation
changes the structure of assets and capital, it is difficult to use historical
data on the growth rate of net profits or cash flow. 240  However, even if
there are significant changes in investment or financial policies, corporate
values can still be accurately estimated if the effects of the changes are
235 Novikoff & Jacobs, supra note 85, at 412.
Note that bankrupt companies present special problems, particularly regarding the
reliability of their projections. Debtors emerging from bankruptcy are generally
troubled companies, and their historical information is often not as reliable an
indicator of future performance as non-reorganizing companies. Thus, the
execution risk associated with debtors' business plans may be unusually high.
Id.
236 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 638-39.
237 According to one commentator, "a significant increase in the required rate of
return attributed to inflationary expectations is generally accompanied by a proportional
increase in the firm's nominal income expectancy." Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1738.
238 See Shaked & Michel, supra note 142, at 42.
239 "Non-operating assets can be segmented into two groups, marketable securities
and illiquid investments." KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 112.
240 EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 464 (9th ed. 2001).
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reflected in the DCF approach and the risk of new operation and financing
is reflected in the discount rate.24'
When the DCF approach is used to estimate the value of the
corporation subject to acquisition, one must consider whether the merger
will bring about synergy, and if so, whether the effect can be estimated
accurately considering that changes in management will affect the cash
flow and risk.
The biggest problem in valuing a private firm using the DCF approach
is the comparative difficulty in estimating the risk to be used in determining
the discount rate. 242 In most risk-return models, the risk is derived from the
past price changes of the assets.243 In calculating the discount rate after the
addition of the added risk premium rate,244 another issue that arises is
whether a restriction can be imposed on the growth rate in calculating
future sales, or whether the risk premium rate should not be considered in
calculating the discount rate245 since the calculation of the sales was made
on the premise that the corporation is in insolvency. Should the growth rate
be lower and the risk premium rate higher in the evaluation? The answer
varies depending on the expert.24 6
2. Estimation of Cash Flow
Is there any method for evaluating the going concern value of a
corporation other than the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach?
The cash flow that is considered in calculating the going concern value
of a corporation is free cash flows (FCF) to the firm. 247  The FCF is
determined by converting non-capital expenses such as income tax,
241 Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 193 n.107 (arguing discount
rate related issues such as time-period and historical data).
242 Id. at 192 ("[Blecause the risk level of common stock investments varies
considerably, expected returns will also vary.").
243 DAMODARAN, supra note 112, at 20-23.
244 Generally, "[a]s the risk increases, all other things being equal, the required rate
of return also increases, and, conversely, the present worth of the firm's securities declines."
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1735.
245 One commentator reported that in Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A.,
634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980) and Duplan Corp., 9 B.R. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), both courts had
expected inflation premiums in consideration of income expectancy that has already been
subtracted in valuation, and argued that "the court gave redundant consideration to purely
nominal projected growth, and thereby tended to overstate the present values." Schwartz,
supra note 29, at 1746. However, in King Resources, taking into account the present prime
rate, the history of the company, risk and depletion, the court added an additional discount
rate to reach the appropriate rate. See 651 F.2d 1326, 1336 n.7 (10th Cir. 1980).
246 Shaked & Michel, supra note 142, at 42 (presenting the case experts' valuation in
In re Mirant Corp., et al.).
247 See Fernandez, supra note 197, at 40, 171 & 600.
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depreciation, capital expenditure, and additional working capital 248 to
earning before income tax (EBIT).249 To calculate FCF, a beeline must be
made for the corporation's balance sheet and cash flow statement .2 °
FCF is meant to measure the amount of money currently being
spent,251 not transactions that previously occurred. FCF is the cash flow
before interest repayment and after tax and principal on the debts, since it is
the cash flow belonging to equity holders, as well as all the parties who
have a right to claims. 2' Essentially, "[t]he FCF is the operating cash flow
that is generated by operation, without taking into account borrowing, after
tax. 25 3 Therefore, it is not affected by the size of the corporation's debts.
However, the present value changes along with the WACC according to the
ratio of debt retention.254 Without a regulatory standard for determining
FCF, investors often disagree on exactly which items should and should not
be treated as capital expenditures.2 5
The expected rising rate of prices affects the corporate value by
changing the nominal cash flow and the nominal discount rate.256 A
solution using actual cash flow and the actual discount rate can be obtained
using the following formula: Actual cash flow = Nominal cash flow / (1 + E
[1]); Actual discount Rate = (1 + Nominal discount rate) / (1 + E [1]) -1.257
Since the non-capital expenses of depreciation and amortization are
expenses with no actual outflow of cash, they are added to the EBIT and are
subject to a corporate tax deduction because they are treated as expenses on
248 It is calculated by subtracting current liabilities from current assets. Free cash
flow is a concept first suggested by prominent financial economist Michael C. Jensen, and
means cash flow left over after investment. Jensen said accumulation of free cash flow
deteriorates corporate value. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324-26 (1986).
249 See KOLLERETAL., supra note 53, at 164.
250 The formula is as follows: FCF = EBIT (1 - Corporate tax rate) + (Non-capital
expenses) - (Capital expenditure) - (Additional working capital). It can be represented
differently as follows: FCF = (Net operating profits less adjusted taxes) + (Noncash
operating expenses) - (Investments in invested capital). See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53,
at 160 & 178.
251 See KING, supra note 88, at 40.
252 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 164; see also BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra
note 240, at 56 ("[F]ree cash flow represents the cash that is actually available for
distribution to investors.").
253 KING, supra note 88, at 40.
254 See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 277-283 and
accompanying text.
255 See Ben McClure, Free Cash Flow: Free, But Not Always Easy INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com /articles/fundamental/03/091 703.asp.
256 "[I]n choosing an appropriate discount rate, most U.S. courts now refer to the
price-eaming (P/E) ratios of the shares of corporations in the same business as the
reorganized firm." Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1736.
257 Here, E [1] is expected interest rate.
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the income statement.258 In order for a corporation to continue to achieve
the expected profit, the operating assets must be maintained at the current
level. 259 This calls for constant capital expenditures and, depending on the
level of growth of these capital expenditures, consideration as to whether
this falls at or below the level of depreciation.260 For a corporation to run
the business and achieve sales, it is necessary to maintain a certain amount
of current assets and current liabilities. Such working capital is calculated
based on the premise that it changes at the same rate as the amount of sale
changes according to the past turnover rate.261
D. Appropriate Discount Rate
Choosing the proper discount rate in valuation can vary and the
method of determining appropriate percentages is controversial. The four
methods outlined in this section are most often applied.
1. Dividend Discount Model
To obtain reliable valuation results, the most important process of the
DCF method is calculating the appropriate discount rate. 262 It should be
noted that the dividend discount model (DDM) calculates (i) the present
value of the future dividends, (ii) the expected return implied by the current
dividend yield, and (iii) projected dividend growth.263 DDM can be defined
as "any formula to value the equity of a cororation by computing the
present value of all expected future dividends." 264 DDM, in theory, can be
applied to all cases, but it is most effective when a corporation has already
distributed a meaningful volume of profits as dividends. DDM is an equity
valuation tool that uses dividends as a measure of the cash flows returned to
the shareholder and calculates the present value of future dividends that a
258 See HORNGREN ET AL., supra note 131, at 288-89 & 294-95.
259 This can be inferred from the following equation: Assets = Liabilities + Owner's
Equity; Assets - Liabilities = Owner's Equity. WARREN ET AL., supra note 112, at 11.
"Owner's equity is. the owner's right to the assets of the business." Id. For a corporation,
"the owner's equity on the balance sheet is called stockholders' equity and is represented by
the balance of the capital stock and retained earnings accounts." Id. at 454.
260 KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 238-39.
261 WARREN ET AL., supra note 112, at 152, 598 ("If the current liabilities are greater
than the current assets, the business may not be able to pay its debts and continue in
business.").
262 See Med Diversified, Inc. et al., 346 B.R. 621, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).
263 The Dividend Discount Model is also known as the "Gordon Model" named after
Professor Myron J. Gordon who popularized the model. Professor Gordon wrote about the
model in a book he authored in 1962 titled "The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the
Corporation." See Diran Bodenhom, The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the
Corporation by Myron J. Gordon, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1174-76 (1962).
264 See FERNANDEZ, supra note 197, at 599.
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corporation is expected to distribute to its shareholders.265  If the
corporation does not have a history of distributing dividends, the calculation
may be based on a sound assumption regarding what the dividends would
265 Under the investor perspective, one industry expert states that:
Proponents of the dividend discount model say that only future cash dividends can
give [the investor] a reliable estimate of a company's intrinsic value....
In truth, the [DDM] requires an enormous amount of speculation in trying to
forecast future dividends. Even when [investors] apply it to steady, reliable,
dividend-paying companies, [he or she] still need[s] to make plenty of assumptions
about their future .... Furthermore, the inputs that produce valuations are always
changing and susceptible to error.
The first big assumption that the DDM makes is that dividends are steady, or grow
at a constant rate indefinitely. But even for steady, reliable, utility-type stocks, it
can be tricky to forecast exactly what the dividend payment will be next year ....
Another sticking point with the DDM is that no one really knows for certain the
appropriate expected rate of return to use. It's not always wise simply to use the
long-term interest rate because the appropriateness of this can change.
In fact, even if the growth rate does not exceed the expected return rate, growth
stocks, which don't pay dividends, are even tougher to value using this model. If
[investors] hope to value a growth stock with the [DDM], [his or her] valuation
will be based on nothing more than guesses about the corporation's future profits
and dividend policy decisions. Most growth stocks don't pay out dividends.
Rather they re-invest earnings into the company with the hopes of providing
shareholders with returns by means of a higher share price.
The [DDM] is by no means the be-all and end-all for valuation .... It forces
investors to evaluate different assumptions about growth and future prospects. If
nothing else, the DDM demonstrates the underlying principle that a company is
worth the sum of its discounted future cash flows. (Whether or not dividends are
the correct measure of cash flow is another question.) The challenge is to make
the model as applicable to reality as possible, which means using the most reliable
assumptions possible.
Ben McClure, Digging into the Dividend Discount Model, INVESTOPEDIA *1,




be if the corporation did distribute dividends.2 66
One expert states that DDM is "garbage in garbage out" which means
assumptions are based only on exact data. 2 7 The substantial disadvantage
of DDM is that it is not helpful in explaining the corporation's intangible
assets, such as an employee's skill.268
2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital
A corporation must raise necessary funds for smooth business activity
or new investment. However, regardless of the sources of the funds raised,
such as debt or equity capital, compensation for the use of funds must be
paid. Investors require a certain return as compensation for providing funds
to the corporation and the corporation must bear this cost in order to use the
funds.269
At this time, the required rate of return by the person providing the
funds, known as the essential rate of return, is the opportunity cost, or rate
that could be earned from a similar investment elsewhere.2 70 Therefore, the
cost of equity capital of the corporation and the required rate of return of
the investors are the same, similar to two sides of the same coin.
On the other hand, when evaluating a corporation's investment plan,
the appropriate discount rate, called the capitalization rate, is applied to the
conversion of future cash flow from the investment into the present value or
the opportunity cost. 271 In other words, to be economically efficient, the
minimum rate of return on the investment must equal the cost of equity
capital of the investment funds. Therefore, the investment's optimal size is
the point where the cost of capital and the marginal rate of return meet.2 72
In general, if the risk and return are in an ordinary relation to one
another, the corporation's cost of capital reflects the risk to the corporation273
and is determined in the capital market. The cost of capital needed for
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 The formula is as follows: DDM ke = (Expected earning rate on dividend) +
(Dividend growth rate) (or Net profit growth rate). See DAMODARAN, supra note 112, at
191-218.
269 Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 192 ("[T]he price paid for an
asset must yield an expected return sufficient to compensate the investor for the risk that the
expected future value is not realized.").
270 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 291.
271 See WARREN ET AL., supra note 112, at 949-62.
272 See Terry Black & Lynn Gallagher, Are Physical Capacity Constraints
Relevant?: Applying Finance-Economics Theory to a Management Accounting
Misconception, 24 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 143, 147-50 (1999).
273 See Bernstein, Seabury & Willimas, supra note 99, at 190-91 ("The cost of debt
capital is typically defined as the yield to maturity on comparable debt instruments traded in
the public market, as adjusted for specific risk factors related to the relevant company.").
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the valuation of a corporation refers to the cost of capital for the funds that
the corporation raised.274 Therefore, in order to estimate the cost of capital
by a corporation, it is important to consider what kinds of funds are used
and how much the corporation uses on the whole; in short, the capital
structure from the credit side of the balance sheet should be taken into
account.
If a corporation is financed entirely by capital, the cost of capital of the
stock will equal the rate of return for the corporation.275 However, when
debt capital and the equity capital costs of the corporation are split fifty-
fifty, the cost of capital of the corporation becomes the average of the
two.
27 6
On the balance sheet of most corporations, it is shown that various
sources of capital are in use and the cost of capital for such corporations is
estimated by the WACC. From the standpoint of value-production, the
accurate estimated capital cost, as well as being the prime factor in the
valuation of a corporation, is the core factor for consideration in
determining the corporation's main purpose which may include choosing
the right budget for the capital, determining the most optimal capital
structure that minimizes the cost of capital, or making the proper price
decisions for various public utility charges.277
The WACC is the weighted average of the cost of equity and cost of
debt based on the proportion of debt and equity in the corporation's capital
structure. 278 To calculate WACC, it is necessary to estimate the cost of
capital for the specific business area,279 which, in being reviewed by the
appraisers, must determine the corporation's cost of debt and cost of
equity. 280 The WACC is the opportunity cost that both creditors and
shareholders expect to be compensated for when they make an investment281
in risky assets. It is also used as the discount rate to convert future cash
274 Id. at 190. ("The costs of capital (debt and equity) used in the WACC are
estimates of appropriate expected returns for the various providers of capital to the
company.").
275 See WARREN ET AL., supra note 112, at 959.
276 See id. (showing the calculation of the combined financing).
277 See KANG ET AL., supra note 230, at 80.
278 "The WACC is going to be lower (thus arriving at a higher value) to the extent
that the calculation assumes more low-cost debt and less high-cost equity." KiNG, supra
note 88, at 105.
279 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 275.
280 Cost of Equity = Risk Free Rate + (Beta x Equity Risk Premium) + Size of Risk;
Cost of Equity = Risk-free Interest Rate + (beta x [Expected Market Return - Risk-Free
Interest Rate]). See Am. HomePatient, Inc., 298 B.R. at 176.
281 Fundamentally, value is based on three factors: growth, risk, and cash flows. See
Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 171.
Bankruptcy Law Dilemma
29:119 (2009)
flow to present value 282 and is the weighted average cost of the equity
capital, as well as others, in the form of the component ratio of the total
capital.283
In In re Mirant Corporation, the court determined that the WACC is
the key component for calculating a value using the DCF method.284 The
simple formula for calculating the WACC is XKi X W. 285 Here, Ki is the
cost of capital after the source of capital supply makes a certain number of
tax payments (i) and W is the weight of the source of capital supply.
286
Once the cost of equity is calculated, an adjustment can be made to
take into account the risk factors specific to the corporation, which may
decrease or increase the corporation's risk profile.287 The WACC takes into
account the cost of each capital, such as debt and equity capital, and is
expressed as the component ratio of each.288
3. Capital Asset Pricing Model
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a risk-return rate model.289
This is a formula that was developed to calculate a firm's cost of equity
capital. In the CAPM, "the risk-free rate and market risk premium are
common to all corporations but only beta varies across corporations.
'" 290
The discount rate for the calculation of the going concern value
282 See KING, supra note 88, at 104.
283 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 291.
284 See In re Mirant Corp, et. al., 334 B.R. 800, 839 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 2005).
285 See KANG ET AL., supra note 230, at 94.
286 The relevant data for the formula of the WACC is presented infra Appendix I.
287 Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 171 ("Although the
fundamental concepts of business valuation hold true when valuing distressed businesses,
particular facts and circumstances may require certain adjustments and additional
considerations.").
288 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 292; see also KING, supra note 88, at 105.
289 It is represented as follows: K, = E (Ri) = Rf+ fli [E (Rm) - Rf].
Here, Rm is the market return and Rf is the risk free interest rate. E (Ri) is the
expected return rate on asset 1; 83i is beta of asset i (= the beta of stock i); E (Rm) is
the expected return rate on the market portfolio; and E [Rm] - Rf is the risk
premium on the market portfolio.
FORMULA: K, = Rf + P3 x (K.n - Rf) Here, Ke is the risk-adjusted discount rate
(also known as the cost of capital), Rf is the rate of a "risk-free" investment, i.e.,
cash, and Km is the return rate of a market benchmark, like the S&P 500.
290 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 295; see also DAMODARAN, supra note 112,
at 70-73 (noting that the capital asset pricing model is built on the premise that the variance
in returns is the appropriate measure of risk, but only that portion of variance that is not
diversifiable is rewarded).
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consists of the risk free interest rate (Rf) and the risk premium rate (RP). In
the CAPM, the most common asset-pricing model, the nondiversifiable
variance of a certain asset is measured by (fi), and the expected earning rate
(E (Ri)) is estimated by the standard of the beta.291 Generally, "[w]here the
debtor is publicly traded, the historical beta is used to determine the
discount rate.",292 Thus, CAPM is not a proper valuation method for closely
held corporations, but was devised to measure publicly held corporate stock
value under the past data.293
The estimated expected return (earning rate or E (Ri)) on the assets is
based on the risk-free interest rate and the "beta risk" is the cost of equity
capital and the discount rate. 294
When calculating corporate value, what problems would arise if only
the rate of return on bonds was used to calculate the discount rate? 295 The
risk premium used in the CAPM is estimated from historical data and is
calculated by subtracting the average return (earning rate) on the risk-free
assets from the average return of the stock. 296  Generally, the risk-free
interest rate, which uses the short-term government bonds return rate and
the market portfolio return rate exceeding the government bond rate
becomes the risk premium.29 7
In Northern Trust Co. v. C.I.R., 298 the U.S. Tax Court stated that "the
beta coefficient is a ratio which compares the movement of stock prices for
publicly traded companies deemed comparable to the company in issue
with the movement of stock prices in general., 299 Thus, it is necessary to
adjust the magnitude of the equity risk premium as the historical average
premium of common stock to the risk profile of the subject company.
291 See BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra note 240, at 250-51.
292 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 54.
293 See Exide Technologies, 303 B.R. 48, 64 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
294 See Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 192-93 ("Beta is the
standardized measure of nondiversifiable risk.... Technically, beta is defined as the
covariance of the returns on the particular asset with the returns on the market portfolio
divided by the variance of the returns on the market portfolio.").
295 Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1735 (noting that the discount rate which is based on
the future cash flow in lieu of the present value of the cash flow must reflect the percentage
of return that a hypothetical investor, knowing all of the facts available to the court, would
expect on every dollar presently invested in the reorganized corporations).
296 See Pullman Const. Indus., Inc., 107 B.R. 909, 921 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
297 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 296; see also BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra
note 240, at 196-97; Novikoff & Jacobs, supra note 85, at 411-12 (quoting expert's
argument on the risk rate).
29 87 T.C. 349 (1986).
299 Id. at 381.
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4. Arbitrage Pricing Model
The one risk-return rate model is the arbitrage pricing model
(APM).3 00 Different from the CAPM, the APM uses various economic
factors in calculating risk,301 although it also sets risk as non-diversifiable.
The risk parameter is estimated by deciding the beta as well as the risk
premium on each general economic factor that determines the return
(earning rate) of the stock as the prime factor in the analysis of the return on
the stock.30 2 Therefore, once the risk premium of the beta factor on
particular factors of a corporation is estimated, it can be used to estimate the
expected return on the stock.30 3
The deciding factor for the risk parameter is the type of business and
the degree of operating and financial leverage.30 4 The degree of business
exposure to the economic risk factors and prime beta factors are determined
by the type of business. In the case of a reorganizing corporation running
multiple businesses, the beta factor of each business is calculated by taking
the weighted average of the market value of each business against the
corporation's market value. 30 5 As the degree of operating leverage and the
degree of financial leverage get larger, the beta on the stock will be higher
and, particularly, the beta on certain economic factors will get higher.
30 6
E. Estimation and Application of Growth Rate
The going concern value by the DCF approach is determined by the
expected cash flow in the future.3 °7 Calculating the exact going concern
value of the expected cash flow in the future must be done by a logical
method. If the expected cash flow is estimated by using the past growth rate




= Rf+ [E(F1) - Rf] f6 + [E(F2) - Rf ] fP2 +. .. + [E(Fk) - Rf ] fik. Here, Rf is the
risk-free interest rate; fli is beta on the factorj; E [Rj] - Rf is the risk premium perj
factor; k is a variety of factors.
301 See Pullman Const. Indus., Inc., 107 B.R. at 921.
302 See KOLLER ET AL., supra note 53, at 294, 317.
303 See Shaked & Michel, supra note 142, at 41 ("Beta is an element of the cost of
equity when using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).").
304 See Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 191-93.
305 id.
306 Id. at 193 ("The higher the perceived risk of a particular common stock
investment, relative to an average common stock investment, the higher the beta.").
307 See supra Part III C. 1; see also supra note 225 and accompanying text; infra note
325 and accompanying text.
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based on the operating performance of the specific corporation, 30 using the
"time-series OLS [ordinary least squares] regression," much of the
compounding effect of the net profit and the growth rate trend for the mid
period can be reflected using the formula from above. 30 9 The application of
the growth rate, assuming single infinite growth, calculates the present
value using the Gordon Growth Model.31°
In the case of a certain single growth rate assumed to be of infinite
growth, because there can be a problem of continuation in the growth
rate,31' the growth phase is divided in two, in which the individual cash
flow in each year is estimated at the beginning phase and thereafter, an
312infinite growth at a certain rate is assumed in the calculation.
Applying such a formula to corporate reorganization valuation in
uniformity is done on the assumption that the cash flow takes place one
time at the end of year.31 3 However, as cash flow does not occur once at the
end of the year, but takes place continuously during the year, it should be
calculated on the assumption that the cash flow takes place in the middle of
308 See, e.g., MFS/Sun Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Services
Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 941-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
309 E, a + b E1. +e.
In this case, the term variable of the regression coefficient "b" represents the change in net
profit per period. In addition, there will be an investment income generated by b'Eo'ROE
every year if the corporation reserves some of the earnings per share every year by a certain
rate "b" and pays (1-b) it as a dividend and makes reinvestment of the reserved earning "b"
generating an investment income by ROE. Therefore, the earnings per share E, of the next
year becomes E0 + b'Eo'ROE. Here, E, becomes (I +g)Eo, an increase by b-ROE and thus g =
b.ROE.
310 PV = NCF, (I+g) / k-g.
This is a model for determining the intrinsic value of a stock, based on a future series of
dividends that grow at a constant rate. Given a dividend per share that is payable in one
year, and the assumption that the dividend grows at a constant rate in perpetuity, the model
calculates the present value of the infinite series of future dividends. The formula is as
follows: Stock Value = [D = Expected dividend per share one year from now] / [k =
Required rate of return for equity investor] - [G = Growth rate in dividends (in perpetuity)].
311 Inflationary expectations prompt investors to project growth in a firm's earnings
even when no real growth is expected. See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1745. As the risk-
free rate rises because of inflationary expectations, investors also increase the rate by which
their expectation of the inflated future income is discounted. See id.
312
PV = , [N CFn/1I+k) + NCF, /k-g× xI/(Il+k) ]
313 This assumption is based on the generally accepted accounting principles and best
strategies for the specific cases. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (FASB),





F. Constructive Approach to the Valuation Methodologies
The practice of the Seoul Central District Court in calculating the
appropriate discount rate is to use the future expected return that creditors
of the concerned corporation expect to be compensated for the risk inherent
in owning the debts.3  This serves as a means of converting future cash
flow into present value. It is calculated by adding the risk premium to the
risk-free interest rate of the financial assets with risk-free investment. 316 In
a situation where a corporation has applied for the commencement of the
corporate reorganization proceeding, the appropriate discount rate takes into
account that the risk premium is higher than that of ordinary
317corporations. One Japanese commentator insists that the discount rate in
the United States is between 8% and 10%,318 whereas in Korea it is between
13% and 15%.319
Since corporations basically have equity capital as the foundation,
should not the discount rate be either the rate of return on the equity capital
or that of the debt capital? In the case of general corporations, unless there
are special circumstances, one cannot assume that there is no equity capital.
It would be desirable to calculate the discount rate allowing for the
314 PC= NCF, (l+k) 
0.5 / k-g.
PV= [NCF, / (1 +k) - 0.5 + NCF, (I +g) (I +k) 0. / k-g x1 / (1 +k) t].
315 See Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 189 ("The discount rate
[here] is the rate of return that would be required by providers of capital (both debt and
equity) to the company to compensate the investors for the time value of money and the
systematic risk inherent in the particular investment.").
316 In the United States, the situation is not so different. Thus, "one caveat to the
CAPM formula is that whenever warranted, experts add a specific risk premium. The
specific risk premium is sometimes calculated using Ibbotson's size premiums, according to
the company's size." Shaked & Michel, supra note 142, at 41. "The court must also choose
a discount rate (or multiplier) that reflects both the current risk-free rate of interest and a risk
premium for uncertainty of the projected income." Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1743.
317 See supra Part III D; see also Jae-pan-yeah-gyoo je-1219-ho (Jaemin 2006-5)
[Korea S. Ct. Civil Trial Rule (No. 1219) (Jaemin 2006-5)], art. 9 (S. Korea); SEOUL
CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT, supra note 187, at 108; supra notes 244, 279-83, 290 & 300-03,
infra note 318 and each accompanying text.
318 See MIKAZUKI ET AL., supra note 127, at 106. However, in In re King Resources
Co., the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the appropriate discount rate for the
oil exploration corporation was 14.5%. Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1736 (citing In re King
Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1980)).
319 The Korean Bankruptcy Court fixed the discount rate in advance to apply it
uniformly to a reorganizing corporation's valuation and, thus, there is no room for discretion
by the appraiser. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
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expected equity capital rather than assuming only debt capital. 320
The shareholders will claim that a low discount rate on the equity
capital and a high discount rate on the debt capital should be applied to
claim their right. On the other hand, the creditors will claim a high discount
rate on the equity capital and a low discount rate on the debt capital to deny
the shareholders' claim.
321
The return on equity capital (the cost of equity capital) is a method that
estimates only the value of the equity capital invested in a corporation, but
the weighted average return on the capital (the weighted average cost of
equity capital) is a valuation method that estimates not only the equity
capital but also the entire corporate value as well as the capital of all other
claims, including preferred shareholders and creditors.32  If debts are
included in debt capital, it could be possible to set the discount rate
separately for secured and unsecured claims. Since the discount rate is a
concept opposite of return, it can be classified by the characteristics of the
investors and by shareholders and creditors.323
IV. DISTRIBUTIONS OF CORPORATE VALUE
Corporate valuation, settling debts, and the distribution of corporate
value are clearly separate proceedings in Korea and are not executed with
mathematical precision. Therefore, at the corporate value distribution
phase, changes in the rights to settled debts can be made. 324
Under the water hypothetical (mentioned above at Section 1. sub-part
A), the reorganization plan allowing only cash repayment is centered on the
calculation of the amount of water coming from the upper stream and the
structure of distributions made to the creditors. However, it shows no
concern for the structure that allows investment into the upper stream to
increase the amount of water coming from the upper stream. Therefore, no
matter how conservative a standpoint the future cash flow and the corporate
value are evaluated from, the feasibility will most likely fade away in the
long term.325 For example, the total sales of construction corporations are
320 "The greater the percentage of debt, the lower the WACC." See King, supra note
88, at 150.
321 In order to be assigned some distributions in the reorganization plan, the
shareholder had to show that the corporate value was sufficient to cover entire debts and any
remaining excess could be distributed to the equity holder. See Frye, supra note 15, at 396.
322 See Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 186-93.
323 See KING ET AL., supra note 88, at 149-51.
324 See supra notes 56 & 71 and each accompanying text.
325 See John Yozzo, Kevin Regan, & Don May, Return On Assets: So Useful... And
So Misused, 20-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 19 (2001).
This fair value is generally determined by means of discounted cash flow (DCF)
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conservatively estimated. However, when the reorganization plan
commences, it becomes impossible to take orders because of external
factors of the reorganizing corporation such as the pre-eligibility test.
Furthermore, a factor such as rainfall may be difficult for the corporation to
increase at its discretion. However, if the reorganizing corporation takes a
structure where it is easy for the water from the upper stream to flow in
while still making distribution to the creditors, the reorganization plan will
have a high feasibility.
A. Distributions of Corporate Value
Why is the guarantee of both liquidation value and going concern
value necessary in bankruptcy law? In the United States, "the debtor's
management has substantial control over the process with an exclusive right
to initially propose a reorganization plan.",32F In order to protect creditors,
"[t]he reorganization plan is premised on an estimate of value for the
restructured firm., 32 7  Some believe that "[b]ankruptcy law resolves
valuation through negotiations. 328 To support that belief, either liquidation
or going concern business value must be guaranteed with fair distribution.
What is the role of debt-for-equity swaps in guaranteeing the
liquidation value and going concern value? From a legal perspective, in
carrying out the debt-for-equity swap, creditors, such as financial
institutions, become subscribers to the paid-in capital increase through
third-party allotment of newly issued stock.329  In this case, financial
organizations' legal status changes from creditors to shareholders and their
responsibilities and duties change along with it. Then, financial institutions
convert loans into investments to promote corporate restructuring and
methodology-that is, by applying a market multiple to the projected operating
income (EBIT) of the reorganized entity and then discounting this amount to
present value. The reorganization value becomes the basis for the emerging
entity's assets on its first post-emergence balance sheet, and is subsequently
allocated to the specific assets of the reorganized company. Given the precarious
prospects of most reorganized entities, conservative operating assumptions and
multiples are typically applied in the determination of reorganization value. This
tendency toward conservatism frequently results in a reorganization value that is
significantly, perhaps drastically, below the debtor's pre-emergence asset values
based on historical costs.
Id.
326 Gilson et al., supra note 191, at 471.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 The debt-for-equity swap emerged as the most attractive measure as it transfers
debt items to capital items without actual transfer of capital. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, A.
A. SOMMER, JR., & LINDA 0. SMIDDY, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
172 (4th ed. 1997).
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actively intervene in corporate management as shareholders. 330 By actively
intervening, companies can save financial costs, such as interest, reduce
their debt ratios, and improve their financial structures through additional
capital finance. 331 However, the debt-for-equity swap needs a legal process
to minimize adverse effects and drawbacks and maximize usefulness.
The distribution method of corporate value calls for cash payment first,
332but supplemental debt-for-equity swaps are acknowledged in Korea. In
setting the terms of payment for creditors, the discount rate used in
calculating the rate for the present value should be the same as the discount
rate in the inspector's report in order to determine whether an amount in
excess of the liquidation value has been guaranteed.333 Can the discount
rate used in calculation of the rate for the present value be differentiated for
each class of creditors between secured claims and unsecured claims? If the
secured creditor uses the asset standard, and the unsecured creditors use the
earning power standard for making cash payment as the principle, the
money for repayment will not be sufficient. However, if the secured
creditors make the cash payments by the asset standard in principle and the
unsecured creditors receive, not the cash payment, but the corporate value
itself in distribution, the shortage problem in repayment will not occur.
Upon establishing the cram-down at the time of reorganization
confirmation, the amount in excess of liquidation value needs to be
guaranteed in repayment to the bankruptcy court's discretion, rather than
the going concern value. 334
Is the fair market price set by the bankruptcy court going to be
liquidation value or going concern value? Should the means of
guaranteeing the rights between secured creditors and unsecured creditors
be differentiated? When the stock concept is used for secured creditors and
the flow concept for unsecured creditors in evaluating the going concern
value, the appraiser should apply different methods for the evaluation.
330 The debt-for-equity swap's economic effects differ from scheme to scheme. See
Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, A Comparative Analysis of Debt for Equity Swap Program in Five
Major Debtor Countries, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 537, 568-71 (1988-1989).
331 See SODERQUIST ET AL., supra note 329, at 172.
332 In Korea the acceptance of new shares in a paid-in capital increase is roughly
separated into: (i) allotment to shareholders, (ii) priority subscription of shareholders, (iii)
allotment to third parties, and (iv) general public subscription. See Regulation on Securities
Issuance and Disclosure, Sec. 3, Art. 57 (Dec. 29, 2000).
333 "A reorganization court should determine the discount rate for future earnings
expectancies as the typical investor would, by first determining the risk-free rate of return
and then adding an appropriate risk premium." Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1735.
334 In the United States, "[the cram-down and best interest of creditor] test entitles
creditors and shareholders to value not less than they would receive in a hypothetical




Generally accepted accounting principles allow the appraiser to apply these
methods.
When the bankruptcy court sets the cram-down, appropriate interest
payments should be paid to secured creditors and unsecured creditors.
Some argue that the interest portion pertaining to the discount rate on the
inspector's report should be used, while others claim the amount should be
based on the market interest rate. One U.S. bankruptcy court suggested that
"the proper cram-down interest rate in the Chapter 11 proceeding must
provide for a 'stream of payment' of the bank's claim under present value
basis. ' 335 This seems to be a good answer.
Tax creditors and wage creditors have special status that allows
priority rights in corporate reorganization proceedings over other unsecured
creditors under special laws such as the National Tax Collection Act336 and
the Labor Standards Act. 337 What impact does the gain on exemption of
debts have on the distribution of corporate value in tax law? What roles do
tax creditors and wage creditors have in the distribution of corporate
value? 338 Is it possible to separately execute the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding for corporations under financial distress and economic
depression?
By reason of its subjective nature,33 9 regardless of the appropriate
method applied, no valuation can be perfect. 340  The following are
hypothetical comparisons among different values which are the available
standard in distribution of corporate value. Notwithstanding the possibility
of these issues being litigated in court, there is a chance that nothing would
happen in the following cases:
1.1. AV > GCV > L > LV
1.2. AV > GCV > LV > L
1.3. AV > LV > L > GCV
1.4. AV > LV > GCV > L
1.5. AV > L > LV > GCV
1.6. AV > L > GCV > LV
2.1. LV > GCV > AV > L
335 See Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 171 B.R. 926, 943 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994).
336 Kook-se-jing-soo-beop Je-2680-ho [National Tax Collection Act of 1975] (Dec.
21, 1974) (amended 2004) (S. Korea).
337 Keun-rho-ki-joon-beop Je-7566-ho [Labor Standards Act No. 7566] (May 31,
2005) (S. Korea).
338 See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1730.
339 See Bernstein, Seabury & Williams, supra note 99, at 171 ("Valuation is both an
objective and subjective process with many areas ripe for the exercise of the discretion of an
expert.").
340 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 63.
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2.2. LV > GCV > L > AV
2.3. LV > AV > GCV > L
2.4. LV > AV > L > GCV
2.5. LV > L > AV > GCV
2.6. LV > L > GCV > AV
3.1. GCV > AV > LV > L
3.2. GCV > AV > L > LV
3.3. GCV > L > AV > LV
3.4. GCV > L > LV > AV
3.5. GCV > LV > AV > L
3.6. GCV > LV > L > AV
4.1. L > AV > GCV > LV
4.2. L > AV > LV > GCV
4.3. L > GCV > AV > LV
4.4. L > GCV > LV > AV
4.5. L > LV > AV > GCV
4.6. L > LV > GCV > AV
In the above equations, AV refers to "asset value;" GCV refers to "going
concern value;" L refers to "liabilities;" and LV refers to "liquidation
value." AV is measured as of a specified point of time; GCV and L are
appraised based on the DCF method.
Not many cases exist, according to Korean law, that present a problem
comparable to going concern value and liquidation value. If the latter is
higher than the former, the bankruptcy judge should mandatorily terminate
the corporate reorganization because liabilities exceed assets.
B. Feasibility of the Reorganization Plan
Under U.S. bankruptcy law, when the court decides to approve a
corporate reorganization plan, it determines the guarantee of the liquidation
value and feasibility at the same time.341  The feasibility is the logical
prospect of the reorganization plan's success 342 and, as expressed in the
341 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(l 1) (2005). This subsection provides that:
The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need
for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor
under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.
Id.
342 The definition of "success" in the reorganization of financially distressed
companies requires several factors: plan confirmation, firm survival, significant debt
reduction and avoidance of post-reorganization financial distress. See Alderson & Betker,
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provision, it means that there is no possibility of liquidation or repetition of
reorganization resulting from the plan's failure.343
The proper capital structures, existence of earning power, 344 economic
circumstances, management ability, and management continuity are
considered in determining the feasibility of the reorganization plan.34 This
standard is subjective but the bankruptcy court at least suggests a
comprehensive standard that requires a comparison between the capital
structure of the corporation concerned and another corporation in the same
industry. Therefore, a reorganization plan that includes a comparison to a
business with a high rate of loan capital can be said to have no feasibility.
To give a concrete example, a fundamental question is whether there is
a logical possibility of financial stability and success for a corporation being
forced to pay debts. Sound finance refers to the harmony between the
capital structure of the corporation and corporate value, along with the
requirement that a feasible return be considered during estimation. 346 The
earning power of the corporation and its value sets the capital structure.34 7
The issue of feasibility concerns the problem of corporate financial
soundness, specifically relating to the capital structure containing the
debts.34 8 However, it must be noted that the problem of feasibility does not
supra note 35, at 2.
343 Courts examine several factors, including:
(1) the adequacy of the [debtor's] capital structure; (2) the earning power of the
[debtor's] business; (3) economic conditions [that the debtor will face during the
plan period]; (4) the ability of [the debtor's present] management; (5) the
probability of the continuation of the same management; and (6) any other related
matter which determines the prospects of a sufficiently successful operation to
enable performance of the provisions of the plan.
Am. Home Patient, Inc. 298 B.R. 152, 169 (Bankr. M.D.Tenn. 2003).
344 "An estimation of earning power must rest upon the corporation's past history of
earnings, the present income, and the indication of future earnings." Caplin, supra note 41,
at 785.
345 The overall standard of the feasibility requirement does not require a guarantee of
the plan's success, but rather that the plan offer "a reasonable prospect" or "reasonable
assurance of success and be workable." U.S. v. Haas, 162 F. 3d 1087, 1090 (11 th Cir. 1998).
346 Debt is not always bad for a reorganized corporation's capital structure.
"Researchers in corporate finance have identified many advantages to debt as a means of
mitigating a wide array of agency problems. If the reorganized firm holds too little debt,
agency problems may prove formidable, thereby reducing the total value of the debtor's
assets." Listokin, supra note 216, at 794-95.
347 See Chiyong Lim, Jung-ri-kye-hoek-ahn-eui-kong-jung, hyung-pyung, soo-haeng-
ga-neung-sung-eh-kwan-han-yeon-gu [A Study on the Fair and Equitable Corporate
Reorganization Plan and Feasibility], 31 SA-BEOP-NON-GYP [JUD. REv.] 755 (2004).
348 See Listokin, supra note 216, at 794 ("The less debt in the bankrupt company
assumed by the reorganized company, the greater the value of the reorganized company's
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address the feasibility of the prepared reorganization plan itself.349 In the
United States, if the majority of creditors involved in the court's decision
have agreed to the reorganization plan, it is considered inappropriate for the
judge to second-guess the proposed plan.
350
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows ordinary debtors to
follow the relative order of priority.35 Though claims at each priority order
have an equal right to the liquidation value, the surplus realized through the
reorganization's capture of going concern value can be mostly distributed in
the manner agreed upon by both creditors and debtor.
35 2
However, without such an agreement, the law sets a very strict order of
priority.3 53 To put it differently, Chapter 11 allows the relative order of
priority in the distribution to follow the reorganization plan as long as a
sufficient number of creditors are satisfied with such distribution. 354
The corporate reorganization systems of Korea, not having adopted
U.S. law, are quite different in terms of the reorganization plan's
preparation and practice.
In the United States, the word reorganization takes a literal meaning in
making capital structure the focus of the reorganization of a corporation.355
In other words, there is an argument about the priority of rights between the
creditors and shareholders centering on the rights of the shareholders in the
newly reorganized corporation. This argument's main point is that
equity.").
141 id. at 755.
350 See MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 341 (1995).
"' Id. at 343.
352 id.
151 See id.; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2), (b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(B)(ii) (2005) provides that:
[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the
... unsecured claims...
[T]he holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will
not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any
property ....
This is the absolute priority rule for the unsecured creditor under the premise that the
corporate value appraised by the going concern value. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2005)
also provides that: "[t]he holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class will
not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any property."
354 See HERBERT, supra note 350, at 343.
355 Listokin, supra note 216, at 808 ("[r]eorganization of the capital structure is one
of [receiver's] essential roles in bankruptcy.").
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compensation for the creditors should be made according to the issuance of
new stocks equivalent to the amount of debts.
On the other hand, the reorganization practice in Korea emphasizes
cash payment centered on the means of performance, the repayment period,
and the rate of indebtedness discharge for ordinary creditors and secured
creditors, rather than the rights of shareholders. Now that the U.S. practice
is focused on whether the capital structure of a new corporation is
reorganized in a fair and equitable manner, the argument has centered on
the fairness and equity rather than on feasibility.35 However, in Korea, a
matter of great interest is whether it is feasible to make payment for the
unsecured claims in accordance with the reorganization plan using
operating profit rather than fairness or equity. Therefore, the general public
ends up resentful of the bankruptcy court's policy when the court fails to
carry out the reorganization plan and the reorganization proceeding is
terminated before it is completed.357  The public strongly criticizes the
corporate reorganization act as an evil law because it protects the previous
owner of the corporation at the expense of the creditors.358
If the liquidation value has to be guaranteed, the feasibility of a
reorganization plan whose going concern value is smaller than liquidation
value would not be possible in Korea without debt-for-equity swaps. In
such a situation, if the reorganization plan makes payment without debt-for-
equity swaps, the reorganization plan would lack feasibility. However, if a
reorganization plan is the proper size for a debt-for-equity swap, it could
become feasible.359
When there is a debt-for-equity swap,360 there is a question as to the
356 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2005) ("The condition that a plan be fair and equitable
with respect to a class includes the following requirements ... ").
357 See Inman Kang, Sin-chung-in-eui-ip-jang-eh-seo-bon-do-san-cheo-ri-sil-moo
[The Practice of the Bankruptcy Law in the Korean Court-Under Petitioner's Perspective]
(2002) (S. Korea), at 4-5, (S. Korea) available at http://www.baekimlee.com/data
/data 1_42.pdf.
358 See Lim, supra note 347, at 791.
359 When financial institutions convert loan claims through a debt-for-equity swap,
company capital increases and debts decrease. This makes for highly effective and improved
financial restructuring. Companies are freed from the burden of high interest rates and are
more likely to increase their operating income. Companies that obtain solid financial
structures through the debt-for-equity swap can then engage in active investments and paid-
in capital increases and use mergers, splits, or asset sales to further the restructuring process.
Cf Christopher Gottscho, Debt Equity Swap Financing of Third World Investments: Will the
I.R.S. Hinder U.S. Swappers? 8 VA. TAx REV. 143, 152 (1988-1989).
360 The debt-for-equity swap is a type of foreign loan restructuring that was used to
solve foreign debt issues in South American countries including Chile, Brazil, and Argentina in
the early 1980s. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 330, at 540-54. The debt-for-equity swap
broadly entails creditors' setting off loan obligations with the payment of the subscription
price of new stocks, and specifically references insolvent companies' internal efforts to
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guarantee of the liquidation value. However, since the creditors have a
100% right over the liquidation value as both creditors and shareholders of
the reorganizing corporation, the swap will not violate the liquidation value
guarantee principle. Moreover, if the corporate value is measured in
different ways like in the United States,36' the price of new procurement
and the fair market price will be higher than the liquidation value, allowing
creditors to have a right over the price of the new procurement and the fair
market price through a debt-for-equity swap. Under this scenario, it would
not be difficult to guarantee the liquidation value.
C. Post-Valuation
Does the bankruptcy judge have to decide the corporate value of a
going concern and of liquidation at the commencement of a reorganization
proceeding or at the time of the filing of the reorganization plan? If the
bankruptcy judge must decide the going concern value of a corporation in
advance, is there any jurisdiction that has such legislation?
At the time the bankruptcy court approves the reorganization plan, it
would not be necessary to have legislation that advances the reporting of
items used in determining the going concern value of a corporation. What
are the possible problems that could arise when the bankruptcy court
decides corporate value at the time of confirming the reorganization plan, as
is the case with Chapter 11 in the United States? One commentator stated
that even in the United States, during the valuation process, "critics have
charged that some courts have manipulated the process to obtain a desired
result. 362
Under Korean law, the receiver reports to the court on the management
conditions of the corporation's affairs and property and on such other
matters as ordered by the court, and prepares an inventory and balance sheet
at the time of confirmation of the reorganization plans, and at other times
determined by the court, and submits certified copies thereof to the court.363
Upon confirmation of the reorganization plan, can a change in the plan
be considered in evaluating corporate value if the reorganization plan fails
and the parties are now seeking to change some conditions of the
eliminate lack of liquidity of funds due to paying fixed-rate interests or repaying principal
and asking creditors to exchange loan obligations for their stocks at a certain ratio. The debt-
for-equity swap mechanism in Korea differs slightly from Latin American countries. For
example, the Latin America countries exchange sovereign debts for local currency equity in a
local company but the Korean debt-for-equity swap used individual private company's debt
from domestic financial institutions. Thus, there are different issues related to the swap. See id.
at 540.
361 See Gilson et al., supra note 191, at 476-89 (introducing various valuation
techniques); see also Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 44-63.
362 See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1731.
363 DRBA, supra note 1, art. 93.
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reorganization plan? The answer to this query is related to the possibility
that the debtor corporation might default again in payment of its post-
confirmation plan obligations even if the debts are adjusted.
3 64
In stretching the meaning of the statute, it seems possible for the
bankruptcy court to order the receiver to calculate the going concern value
and the liquidation value following the confirmation of the reorganization
plan. The receiver can be made to include the collected data calculated
based on these values, setting the standard of the annual report to be
reported to the bankruptcy court at year-end, and the court can continue to
review the feasibility of the reorganization plan based on such date. Thus,
reevaluations can be done any number of times. The rationale is that even
in the same bankruptcy reorganization proceeding for different purposes,
the post-valuation of a debtor corporation's assets, property, and enterprise
value is not resjudicata.365
D. Mergers and Acquisitions
Generally, in business or economics, a merger or acquisition is a
combination of two corporations into one larger company. 366 Such actions
are commonly voluntary and involve stock swap or cash payment to the
target.367 In Korea, however, the merger or acquisition of a reorganizing
corporation is a special sale of a reorganized corporation to an acquirer,
with proceeds distributed to creditors. Revival of an insolvent company
through a third-party acquisition or merger has been introduced as a useful
368method throughout the world. It is regulated by the bankruptcy court's
supervisory power over a reorganized corporation.
Prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the concept of corporate
restructuring was narrowly interpreted to denote negative ideas such as job
cuts, wage reductions, and the elimination of ailing companies.
369
However, following the crisis, the concept was expanded to describe the
process used by companies to attain greater efficiency and competitiveness.
Today, a majority of Korean companies recognize that corporate
364 See Novikoff & Jacobs, supra note 85, at 401-02 (answering this question using
court holdings).
365 See Richardson, 97 B.R. 161, 162 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Fairchild v.
Lebanon Prod. Credit Ass'n, 31 B.R. 789, 795 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1983).
366 A merger is the perfection of economic corporate combination. However, "[a]
merger differs from a consolidation, which is a business combination whereby two or more
companies join to form an entirely new company." GAUGHAN, supra note 93, at 7.
367 See DRBA, supra note 1, arts. 207-08, 210-11 & 213.
368 See Kent Clark & Eli Ofek, Mergers as a Means of Restructuring Distressed
Firms: An Empirical Investigation, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 541 (1994).
369 See Martin Hart-Landsberg & Paul Burkett, Economic Crisis and Restructuring in
South Korea: Beyond the Free Market-Statist Debate, 33:3 CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES 413,
415 & 421 (2001).
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restructuring is a process that must be relentlessly pursued as an ongoing
concern. 370  Under Korea's Chapter 11, companies are always sold and
restructured simultaneously because liquidation assumes that a business has
no future.37'
The corporate restructuring process should depend purely on
negotiations between creditor and debtor in the market mechanism, 372 as the
reorganizing company is an independent operating company, without any
intervention from creditors. The number of corporate reorganizations and
compositions sharply increased between 1997 and 1998. 373  Korea's
corporate restructuring model 374 is quite different from U.S. Chapter 11. In
370
See Yon Won-young Yon, KAMCO Spurs Corporate Restructuring, KOREA TIMES,
May 13, 2004, at 9 (on file with author).
371 The sales are controlled by the court in a commercially reasonable manner. See
Hoi-saeng-sil-moo-jun-chik-je- 11-ho: Hoi-saeng-jeol-cha-eh-seo-eui-M&A-eh-kwan-han-
jun-chik [Model Rule of a Reorganizing Firm 11: M&A Model Rule of a Reorganizing
Firm] (Apr. 1, 2006) (Seoul Central District Court) (S. Korea). Cf. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)
(1978).
372 In a bullish economy, there are more acquirers than sellers in the corporate
mergers and acquisitions market. On the contrary, in the weak economy of the bear market,
the opposite is true.
373 See NATIONAL COURT ADMINISTRATION, SA-BEOP-YEON-GAM 1998 [JUDICIAL
YEARBOOK OF 1998] (1998) (S. Korea).
374 One practitioner states that:
The corporate restructuring process in Korea can be categorized into three major
stages. During the first stage (financial crisis of 1997 to August 2000), the
government pushed forward structural reforms based on the International
Monetary Fund agreement. In 1998, the five largest business groups engaged in
"Big Deals," or the swapping of business areas amongst themselves, and also
signed capital structure improvement plans approved by their main creditor banks.
The restructuring of the 6th to 64th largest corporations focused on addressing
short-term liquidity problems in the form of bank-led "workouts." For small- and
medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs"), creditor banks assessed their credit risks and
placed those deemed viable in workouts and provided support. After several failed
attempts to restructure itself independently, Daewoo Group (one of the five largest
corporations) was also placed under the management of its creditor banks to
reduce market instability. The second stage (September 2000 to February 2001)
began with the president's appointment of a new economic team to address the
growing concern of possibly another economic crisis due to the liquidity problems
of the Hyundai Group and high oil prices. While focusing on the resolution of
potentially insolvent companies and improvements in corporate governance and
financial structures, the government pursued reforms in four main sectors:
corporate, financial, public and labor. During the third stage (March 2001 to
present), corporate reform shifted from government-led to market-driven reform.
The introduction of the Corporate Credit Risk Evaluation System in March 2001
and the KCRPA in September 2001 provided the framework to facilitate market-
led corporate restructuring and the self-restructuring of SMEs.
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Korea, previous owners' stakes are written off by capital reduction or
diluted by a debt-for-equity swap by creditors. 11 Then a third party
acquirer comes in to subscribe for new shares. The proceeds from the new
shares are used for repaying remaining debt after conversion.376 Hence, the
acquirer gets a majority stake in the company and if the acquirer wants to
exit from his investment, he has to process another merger or acquisition or
block the transaction through the capital market. Therefore, it is not easy
for a financial investor to get out of this position. The Korean bankruptcy
court has initiated an active mergers and acquisitions program for those
under court supervision. When mergers and acquisitions are dealt with in
the bankruptcy court, creditors negotiate more on capital reduction ratio,
treatment of secured and unsecured credits, and stock prices, rather than on
a debtor company's profitability.377 Secured and unsecured creditors have
opposing positions on corporate valuation for workouts,378 mergers and
acquisitions, and the process is even more difficult because there is no
judge involved to decide between different creditors' interests.
379
It seems that the direction in which the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding should be headed is properly suggested by the bankruptcy law
that sets the basis of the policy for the bankruptcy court and by which the
reorganized corporation's mergers and acquisitions are also being executed.
Until now, among many of the reorganized corporations that have
successfully completed mergers and acquisitions, the liquidation value is
higher than the going concern value.38° It is economical to terminate the
reorganization proceeding when the liquidation value is high. At that point,
transfer to a liquidation proceeding does not seem logical for either
creditors or debtors.
In mergers and acquisitions of a reorganizing corporation with a high
liquidation value, the acquisition fee or proceeds should in principle be
more than the liquidation value.381  If more cash is brought in than the
Yoo Ji-chang, Restructuring Means More Than Payroll Cut, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004 (on
file with author).
375 See DRBA, supra note 1, art. 205(3).
376 See SEOUL CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT, supra note 187, at 516.
371 Id. at 514-27.
378 See GAUGHAN, supra note 93, at 447-48.
379 Detailed official statistics are not available from the Korean Bankruptcy Court,
but the court succeeded in two M&A cases in 2000, fourteen cases in 2001, eighteen cases in
2002, eight cases in 2003, fifteen cases in 2004, six cases in 2005. See Jejeong Lee, Hoi-sa-
jung-ri-jeol-cha-eui-seo-eui-M&A [Mergers and Acquisitions in Corporate Reorganization
Proceedings], INKWON-KWA-CHONGUI [HUM. RTS. & JUST.], Dec. 2005, at 64 (S. Korea).
380 See HYOSOON NAM & JAEHYUNG KIM, DO-SAN-BEOP-GANG-EUI [BANKRUPTCY
LAW] 677-78 (2005) (S. Korea).
381 Lorie R. Beers, Preparing The Distressed Company For Sale, 26 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 44 (2007).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:119 (2009)
liquidation value, the merger and acquisition is, in fact, considered to be
equal to the liquidation sale to a third party as a going concern value.
However, if the acquirer insists on paying an acquisition fee equal to the
level of the going concern value because it is lower than the liquidation
value, such mergers and acquisitions will have no chance of success. From
the creditors' standpoint, the capital amounts to more than the going
concern value and can be recovered even if the corporation goes
bankrupt.382 Moreover, the cost of new procurement and the fair market
price are far higher than the liquidation value.
Even for a corporation with a high liquidation value, the acquirer will
often make the acquisition fee or merger proceeds payment exceed the
going concern value or, for a listed corporation, the acquirer will make a
proper size debt-for-equity swap with the creditors.383 When the structure
allows both the creditors and the acquirer to share the corporate value
through the debt-for-equity swap and the issuance of premium bonds, it is
reconstruction in a genuine sense. It may also take the form of succession
to liabilities for certain amounts that bring more economic benefits than in
the bankruptcy policy.
384
In the comparatively short history of the corporate reorganization
regime, I would consider the mergers and acquisitions from Korea outlined
above to generally occur during the transitional stages of the reorganization
plan. I propose, however, that such mergers and acquisitions should be
made not at the stage of changing the reorganization plan, but at the stage of
preparing the reorganization plan. At the stage of preparing the
reorganization plan, rather than using the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding, a more advantageous restructuring strategy for creditors would
be liquidation value, the corporate value derived from future cash flow, and
In a healthy M&A environment, one can rely on the marketplace to yield an
appropriate value for the company. In a distressed environment, likely buyers will
disregard the opportunity because they do not like "hair on the deal" and will not
buy into an operational turnaround. Additionally, when the market perceives
distressed sellers as desperate, buyers often offer considerably less than they might
otherwise.
Id.
382 This result is extremely natural because "bankruptcy was designed as a creditor's
remedy." M. Jonathan Hayes, Formulating and Confirming a Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization, 2 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAc. 5 (2000).
383 Beers, supra note 381, at 44 ("Sellers in the distressed market should, however,
have a clear picture of what the liquidation value of the company's assets looks like as
compared to the sale of the company on a going-concern basis.").
384 See Alderson & Betker, supra note 35, at 4 ("Chapter 11 reorganization gives
distressed firms an incentive to separate by providing the shareholders of inefficient firms a
share of the surplus created from reducing overinvestment.").
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the price of new procurement and the fair market price. 385
According to such a restructuring plan, it should be noted that the
corporation can return to normal operation or begin getting back to
normalization.38 6 If the corporation gets back to normalization and gains
approval of the reorganization plan at the same time, the controlling
shareholders will be determined according to the rate of the debt-for-equity
swap, the rate of reduction in capital for stocks, and through stock
transactions by the controlling shareholder. Under this scenario, the merger
or acquisition advantageous to the creditors can be carried out naturally.
Especially if the going concern value is clearly higher than the liquidation
value, a merger or acquisition and a reorganization plan where only the
liquidation value is paid back to the creditors without the debt-for-equity
swap cannot be considered reorganization in a true sense.
When dealing with a corporation whose going concern value is higher
than the liquidation value as opposed to a corporation whose liquidation
value is higher than the going concern value, the method and terms for a
merger or acquisition should be determined differently. If the corporation
has a high going concern value and is a listed corporation, the right to
participate in the reconstruction of the corporation should be given to the
creditors first.
As in Pan Ocean Shipping Company,38 7 after making a debt-for-equity
swap without a merger or acquisition terminating the reorganization plan,
execution can become a basic model. If a reorganization plan is changed in
the midst of being carried out by the bankruptcy court, there can be
problems of fairness and equity due to the change in liquidation value of the
fixed accounting policy that is the basis of valuation for the secured claims.
E. Balance Sheet After Reorganization Plan Approval
If the going concern value is estimated by the earning power standard,
as in Korea, the balance sheet should be prepared 38 8 using the going
concern value based on the earning power. 389 In this way, the inconsistency
385 See Novikoff & Jacobs, supra note 85, at 411 (discussing valuation methods for
mergers and acquisition. Under the current situation, if "the DCF methodology is well-
accepted in valuing [reorganizing] companies in the M&A context" in the United States,
then the same valuation methods are applied in Korea).
386 See Alderson & Betker, supra note 35, at 5 ("If in spite of being inefficient,
reorganization is chosen over liquidation, the success of a Chapter 11 plan can only be
evaluated by comparing the cash flows from reorganization with the cash flows that would
have been available under liquidation.").
387 Judgment of May 20, 2002, 92 Pa 1040 (Seoul Dist. Court).
388 See supra note 100-101 and accompanying text.
389 Caplin, supra note 41, at 779 ("Earning power, it is said, is the only realistic basis
for valuation."); id at 787 ("It might be true that, all things being equal, earning power
would prove the best and most accurate basis for valuing the railroad property. Surely the
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between the assets on the balance sheet and the going concern value can be
settled. If there is a dispute about the current law in Korea, it should be
resolved via legislation.
CONCLUSION
One leading opinion suggests that if a corporation intends to file for
bankruptcy reorganization, it should do so in the United States, not in
Korea. 90 In Korea, the economic players, as well as the government, have
tried to create better circumstances for corporations to do business.3 91
However, in the area of bankruptcy law, the dominant tendency up to this
point has been to follow a macroeconomic approach. One of the reasons
for such a tendency may be that there is not much helpful data on legislative
cases from the United States.
In the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding, legislation that decides
between liquidation and reorganization using only one measure, future cash
flow, and current bankruptcy court practices, should be changed. Even if a
corporation is in normal operation and generates operating profits under
ordinary economic circumstances, many corporations in the future may
become involuntarily insolvent.
For example, if large-scale tort actions are filed due to environmental
pollution or a class-action results from a violation of securities regulations,
the parties can request an attachment relief on the assets of a corporation, or
other injunctive relief, resulting in temporary but extraordinary financial
distress to the corporation. From debtors' and creditors' standpoints, if this
situation is viewed dispassionately, it can appear to be involuntary. This is
because no one can be sure about the estimation of future cash flow.
Under the current system, when the going concern value is lower than
the liquidation value, the corporation must terminate the reorganization
proceeding even if the going concern value is in principle higher than the
debt. The decision should not be left unsettled where a corporation that
followed the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding on account of
involuntary circumstances cannot present a reorganization plan to its
creditors for the sole reason of having a high liquidation value. The reason
that it is possible for the going concern value to be higher than the debt is
because not all of the claimed amount arising from the dispute will become
debt. If no one can be sure of future cash flow, no executives or
logical answer to the valuation question would seem to lie in the earning capacity.").
390 See Soonyoung Myung, Pa-san-gi-up-eh-ya-bak-han-europe: Jae-gi-ha-ryuh-gu-
deon-mi-kuk-seo-mang-ha-rah? [Europe's Stinginess Towards Bankrupt Corporations:
Should a Failed Corporation Rebuild in the U.S.?], MAEKYUNG EcoN., Apr. 10, 2002, at 53
(stating that should you wish to turn around it is best to go bankrupt in the U.S. and further
stating that in England, the rebuilding of a corporation imitates the United States) (S. Korea).
391 See KIM, supra note 25, at 466-71.
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shareholders will want to undergo reconstruction in a bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding where there is an uncertain future.
What is clear is that the bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in
Korea should be executed differently. Even without reforming the law,
revisions could still be made to the Supreme Court rule on valuation
methods for going concern value and current practice of the bankruptcy
court. Ultimately, the law that only allows unilateral valuation standards
should be fundamentally reformed so that both the estimation of the final
corporate value and its distribution can be made by the bankruptcy court.
Multiple valuation methods should be used to increase the likelihood of the
accuracy of the valuation.
392
As no further support for new capital is needed for a corporation such
as the one addressed above, neither the government nor the creditors can
intervene, thus raising an issue of economic efficiency. The means of
reorganizing a corporation should be discussed between the creditors and
debtors, including those claiming to have suffered damage due to torts or
statutory violations. If a corporation used a bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding due to a dispute over large-scale environmental pollution, the
fact that such a case is settled with a trust is noteworthy. The bankruptcy
court need only review the arguments and settlement to ensure it was
formed within the legal boundary.
Not surprisingly, the reality in Korea is different. As discussed earlier,
due to the fear of bankruptcy liquidation, it is, in fact, impossible to dream
of reorganizing a corporation within the bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding. As a result, bankruptcy reorganization proceedings are
perverted because the debtors or shareholders are led by creditors who are
well acquainted with the weak points of the corporation. Some special
creditors who have lots of information can easily control the outcome of
every subject in a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding in Korea.
The DRBA, effective since May 2006, is in the process of adopting all
of the provisions of the past Corporate Reorganization Act.393 Given the
circumstances, it is important to keep in mind that a legal system can be
made that is not appropriate for the actual conditions in Korea but merely a
pursuit of the ideal. When interested parties in the bankruptcy system
attempt to enact or reform bankruptcy law, they should make an effort to
have a wide understanding of the Korean legal system and foreign
legislative cases. I hope that there will be legal reforms of corporate
valuation and its distribution methods that will be appropriate for the real
situation in Korea.
392 See Heroy & Schaeffer, supra note 33, at 63.
393 The Corporate Reorganization Act was repealed on March 31, 2006 and replaced
with the DRBA.
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DEVELOPMENT Yr Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 Yr 5
SALES 3,060 5,604 4,852 4,693 5,668 6,162
OPERATING PROFITS 51 451 376 361 474 529
CASH FLOW 386 718 669 385 124 326
DISCOUNT RATE (r) 0.155 0.154 0.153 0.152 0.151 0.15
PRESENT VALUE 10 Yr 346 558 451 225 63 144








DEVELOPMENT Yr 6 Yr 7 Yr 8 Yr 9 Yr 10 TOTAL
SALES 6,469 6,757 7,020 7,261 7,450 64,996
OPERATING PROFITS 557 576 599 619 632 5,225
CASH FLOW 352 328 369 394 404 4,455
DISCOUNT RATE (r) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
PRESENT VALUE 10 Yr 135 109 107 99 88 2,325
PV After 11 Yr 592
NON OPERATING ASSET 2,219




394 The Seoul Bankruptcy courts apply the growth rate in the final projected year as the
terminal growth rate. This is true for "PV After 11 Yr" in each section of Appendix I.
Bankruptcy Law Dilemma
29:119 (2009)
APPENDIX I-CORPORATE VALUE OF KOREA INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT INC.
(KRW / BILLION) CONTINUED
KOREA INDUSTRY Annual Y/r Y/r Y/r
DEVELOPMENT Average (0.15) (0.1) (0.05)
SALES 5,908
OPERATING PROFITS 475
CASH FLOW 405 405/ 405/ 405/
DISCOUNT RATE (r) 0.15 0.1 00.05
PRESENT VALUE 10 Yr
P ftr1Yr2,700 4,050 8,100PV After 11 Yr
NON OPERATING ASSET 2,219 2,219 2,219




APPENDIX 11-CORPORATE VALUE OF DONGSUH INDUSTRIAL
INC. (KRW / BILLION)
DONGSUH INDUSTRIAL PREP.
Yr Yrl Yr2 Yr 3 Yr4 Yr5
SALES 1,270 1,230 1,443 1,679 1,710 1,738
OPERATING PROFITS -15 99 173 232 225 216
CASH FLOW 6 163 180 237 272 261
DISCOUNT RATE (r) 0.155 0.155 0.154 0.153 0.152 0.151
PRESENT VALUE 10 Yr -2 105 113 118 133 110







395 The Seoul Bankruptcy courts apply the growth rate in the final projected year as the
terminal growth rate. This is true for "PV After 11 Yr" in each section of Appendix II.
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APPENDIX 1I-CORPORATE VALUE OF DONGSUH INDUSTRIAL
INC. (KRW / BILLION) CONTINUED
DONGSUH INDUSTRIAL Yr 6 Yr 7 Yr 8 Yr 9 Yr 10 TOTAL
SALES 1,764 1,770 1,813 1,829 1,887 18,133
OPERATING PROFITS 209 192 177 157 145 1,810
CASH FLOW 218 196 178 172 155 2,038
DISCOUNT RATE (r) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
PRESENT VALUE 10 Yr 83 64 44 35 27 830
PV After 11 Yr 184
NON OPERATING ASSET 89




DONGSUH INDUSTRIAL Annual Y/r Y/r Y/r
Average (0.15) (0.1) (0.05)
SALES 1,648
OPERATING PROFITS 164
CASH FLOW 185 185/ 185/ 185/
DISCOUNT RATE (r) 0.15 0.1 0.05
PRESENT VALUE 10 Yr 12 18 37
P ftr1Yr1,233 1,850 3,700PV After I1I Yr
NON OPERATING ASSET 89 89 89
GOING CONCERN VALUE 1,322 1,939 3,789
LIQUIDATION VALUE
ASSETS
LIABILITUES
